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Abstract. Observational equivalence allows us to study important security properties such as anonymity. Unfortunately, the
difficulty of proving observational equivalence hinders analysis. Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet simplify its proof by introducing a
sufficient condition for observational equivalence, called diff-equivalence, which is a reachability condition that can be proved
automatically by ProVerif. However, diff-equivalence is a very strong condition, which often does not hold even if observational
equivalence does. In particular, when proving equivalence between processes that contain several parallel components, e.g.,
P | Q and P′ | Q′, diff-equivalence requires that P is equivalent to P′ and Q is equivalent to Q′. To relax this constraint,
Delaune, Ryan & Smyth introduced the idea of swapping data between parallel processes P′ and Q′ at synchronisation points,
without proving its soundness. We extend their work by formalising the semantics of synchronisation, formalising the definition
of swapping, and proving its soundness. We also relax some restrictions they had on the processes to which swapping can be
applied. Moreover, we have implemented our results in ProVerif. Hence, we extend the class of equivalences that can be proved
automatically. We showcase our results by analysing privacy in election schemes by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta, Lee et al., and
Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson, and in the vehicular ad-hoc network by Freudiger et al.
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1. Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are required to satisfy a plethora of security requirements. These require-
ments include classical properties such as secrecy and authentication, and emerging properties including
anonymity [1–3], ideal functionality [4–6], and stronger notions of secrecy [7–9]. These security re-
quirements can generally be classified as indistinguishability or reachability properties. Reachability
properties express requirements of a protocol’s reachable states. For example, secrecy can be expressed
as the inability of deriving a particular value from any possible protocol execution. By comparison, in-
distinguishability properties express requirements of a protocol’s observable behaviour. Intuitively, two
protocols are said to be indistinguishable if an observer has no way of telling them apart. Indistinguisha-
bility enables the formulation of more complex properties. For example, anonymity can be expressed as
the inability to distinguish between an instance of the protocol in which actions are performed by a user,
from another instance in which actions are performed by another user.
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Indistinguishability can be formalised as observational equivalence, denoted ≈. As a motivating ex-
ample, consider an election scheme, in which a voter A voting v is formalised by a process V(A, v).
Ballot secrecy can be formalised by the equivalence
V(A, v) | V(B, v′) ≈ V(A, v′) | V(B, v) (1)
which means that no adversary can distinguish when two voters swap their votes [2]. (We use the applied
pi calculus syntax and terminology [5], which we introduce in Section 2.)
1.1. Approaches to proving equivalences
Observational equivalence is the tool introduced for reasoning about security requirements of cryp-
tographic protocols in the spi calculus [4] and in the applied pi calculus [5]. It was originally proved
manually, using the notion of labelled bisimilarity [5, 10, 11] to avoid universal quantification over
adversaries.
Manual proofs of equivalence are long and difficult, so automating these proofs is desirable. Automa-
tion often relies on symbolic semantics [12, 13] to avoid the infinite branching due to messages sent
by the adversary by treating these messages as variables. For a bounded number of sessions, several
decision procedures have been proposed for processes without else branches, first for a fixed set of prim-
itives [14, 15], then for a wide variety of primitives with the restriction that processes are determinate,
that is, their execution is entirely determined by the adversary inputs [16]. These decision procedures
are too complex for useful implementations. Practical algorithms have since been proposed and imple-
mented: SPEC [17] for fixed primitives and without else branches, APTE [18] for fixed primitives with
else branches and non-determinism, and AKISS [19, 20] for a wide variety of primitives and determinate
processes.
For an unbounded number of sessions, proving equivalence is an undecidable problem [14, 21], so au-
tomated proof techniques are incomplete. ProVerif automatically proves an equivalence notion, named
diff-equivalence, between processes P and Q that share the same structure and differ only in the choice of
terms [22]. Diff-equivalence requires that the two processes always reduce in the same way, in the pres-
ence of any adversary. In particular, the two processes must have the same branching behaviour. Hence,
diff-equivalence is much stronger than observational equivalence. Maude-NPA [23] and Tamarin [24]
also use that notion, and Baudet [25] showed that diff-equivalence is decidable for a bounded num-
ber of sessions and used this technique for proving resistance against off-line guessing attacks [26]. To
deal with limitations of diff-equivalence, other sufficient conditions have been designed for particular
classes of equivalences, e.g., anonymity and unlinkability [27] and ballot secrecy [28]. These conditions
can be checked automatically using tools such as ProVerif. The definition of ballot secrecy in [28] is
based on trace equivalence and its relationship with (1) is unknown. Decision procedures also exist for
restricted classes of protocols: for an unbounded number of sessions, trace equivalence has a decision
procedure for symmetric-key, type-compliant, acyclic protocols [29], which is too complex for useful
implementation, and for ping-pong protocols [30], which is implemented in a tool.
1.2. Diff-equivalence and its limitations
In this paper, we focus on proofs of observational equivalence in the applied pi calculus. The main
approach to automate proofs of observational equivalence with an unbounded number of sessions is to
use diff-equivalence. (In our motivating example (1), a bounded number of sessions is sufficient, but
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an unbounded number becomes useful in more complex examples, as in Section 4.2.) Diff-equivalence
seems well-suited to our motivating example, since the processes V(A, v) | V(B, v′) and V(A, v′) |
V(B, v) differ only by their terms. Such a pair of processes can be represented as a biprocess which has
the same structure as each of the processes and captures the differences in terms using the construct
diff[M,M′], denoting the occurrence of a term M in the first process and a term M′ in the second. For
example, the pair of processes in our motivating example can be represented as the biprocess P =
V(A, diff[v, v′]) | V(B, diff[v′, v]). The two processes represented by a biprocess P are recovered by fst(P)
and snd(P). Hence, fst(P) = V(A, v) | V(B, v′) and snd(P) = V(A, v′) | V(B, v).
Diff-equivalence implies observational equivalence. Hence, the equivalence (1) can be inferred from
the diff-equivalence of the biprocess P. However, diff-equivalence is so strong that it does not hold for
biprocesses modelling even trivial schemes, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 1. Consider an election scheme that instructs voters to publish their vote on an anonymous
channel. The voter’s role can be formalised as V(A, v) = c〈v〉. Thus, ballot secrecy can be analysed
using the biprocess P = c〈diff[v, v′]〉 | c〈diff[v′, v]〉. It is trivial to see that fst(P) = c〈v〉 | c〈v′〉 is indistin-
guishable from snd(P) = c〈v′〉 | c〈v〉, because any output by fst(P) can be matched by an output from
snd(P), and vice-versa. However, the biprocess P does not satisfy diff-equivalence. Intuitively, this is
because diff-equivalence requires that the subprocesses of the parallel composition, namely, c〈diff[v, v′]〉
and c〈diff[v′, v]〉, each satisfy diff-equivalence, which is false, because c〈v〉 is not equivalent to c〈v′〉 (nor
is c〈v′〉 equivalent to c〈v〉).
Overcoming the difficulty encountered in Example 1 is straightforward: using the general property that
P | Q ≈ Q | P, we can instead prove V(A, v) | V(B, v′) ≈ V(B, v) | V(A, v′), which, in the case of
Example 1, is proved by noticing that the two sides of the equivalence are equal, i.e., by noticing that
the biprocess Pˆ = c〈diff[v, v]〉 | c〈diff[v′, v′]〉 trivially satisfies diff-equivalence, since fst(Pˆ) = snd(Pˆ).
However, this technique cannot be applied to more complex examples, as we show below.
Some security properties (e.g., privacy in elections [2, 31], vehicular ad-hoc networks [3, 32], and
anonymity networks [1, 33, 34]) can only be realised if processes synchronise their actions in a specific
manner.
Example 2. Building upon Example 1, suppose each voter sends their identity, then their vote, both on
an anonymous channel, i.e., V(A, v) = c〈A〉.c〈v〉. This example does not satisfy ballot secrecy, because
V(A, v) | V(B, v′) can output A, v, B, v′ on channel c in that order, while V(A, v′) | V(B, v) cannot.
To modify this example so that it satisfies ballot secrecy, we use the notion of barrier synchronisation,
which ensures that a process will block, when a barrier is encountered, until all other processes executing
in parallel reach this barrier [35–38].
Example 3. Let us modify the previous example so that voters publish their identity, synchronise with
other voters, and publish their vote on an anonymous channel. The voter’s role can be formalised as
process V(A, v) = c〈A〉.1:: c〈v〉, where 1:: is a barrier synchronisation. Ballot secrecy can then be
analysed using biprocess Pex = c〈A〉.1:: c〈diff[v, v′]〉 | c〈B〉.1:: c〈diff[v′, v]〉. Synchronisation ensures the
output of A and B, prior to v and v′, in both fst(Pex) and snd(Pex), so that ballot secrecy holds, but
diff-equivalence does not hold.
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The technique used to overcome the difficulty in Example 1 cannot be applied here, because swapping
the two voting processes leads to the biprocess P′ex = c〈diff[A, B]〉.1:: c〈v〉 | c〈diff[B, A]〉.1:: c〈v′〉, which
does not satisfy diff-equivalence. Intuitively, we need to swap at the barrier, not at the beginning (cf. P′ex).
In essence, by swapping data between the two voting processes at the barrier, it suffices to prove that
the biprocess P′′ex = c〈A〉.1:: c〈diff[v, v]〉 | c〈B〉.1:: c〈diff[v′, v′]〉 satisfies diff-equivalence, which trivially
holds since fst(P′′ex) = snd(P′′ex).
As illustrated in Examples 1 & 3, diff-equivalence is a sufficient condition for observational equiv-
alence, but it is not necessary, and this precludes the analysis of interesting security properties. In this
paper, we will partly overcome this limitation: we weaken the diff-equivalence requirement by allowing
swapping of data between processes at barriers.
1.3. Contributions
First, we extend the process calculus by Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet [22] to capture barriers (Section 2).
Secondly, we formally define a compiler that encodes barriers and swapping using private channel com-
munication (Section 3). As a by-product, if we compile without swapping, we also obtain an encoding
of barriers into the calculus without barriers, via private channel communication. Thirdly, we provide
a detailed soundness proof for this compiler. Fourthly, we have implemented our compiler in ProVerif.
Hence, we extend the class of equivalences that can be proved automatically. Finally, we analyse privacy
in election schemes and in a vehicular ad-hoc network to showcase our results (Section 4).
This manuscript mainly differs from its conference version [39] by the inclusion of proofs and addi-
tional examples and explanations.
1.4. Comparison with Smyth et al.
The idea of swapping data at barriers was informally introduced by Delaune, Ryan & Smyth [40, 41].
Our contributions improve upon their work by providing a strong theoretical foundation to their idea. In
particular, they do not provide a soundness proof, we do; they prohibit replication and place restrictions
on control flow and parallel composition, we relax these conditions; and they did not implement their
results, we implement ours. (Smyth presented a preliminary version of our compiler in his thesis [42,
Chapter 5], and Klus, Smyth & Ryan implemented that preliminary compiler [43]. The preliminary
compiler differs from the one presented here; moreover, it was not proved sound. In contrast, we prove
that the compiler we have implemented in ProVerif is sound.)
2. Process calculus
We recall Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet’s dialect [22] of the applied pi calculus [5, 44]. This dialect
is particularly useful due to the automated support provided by ProVerif [45, 46]. The semantics of the
applied pi calculus [5] and the dialect of [22] were defined using structural equivalence. Those semantics
have been simplified by semantics with configurations and without structural equivalence, first for trace
properties [47], then for equivalences [25, 48, 49]. In this paper, we use the latter semantics. In addition,
we extend the calculus to capture barrier synchronisation, by giving the syntax and formal semantics of
barriers.
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2.1. Syntax and semantics
The calculus assumes an infinite set of names, an infinite set of variables, and a finite set of function
symbols (constructors and destructors), each with an associated arity. We write f for a constructor, g for a
destructor, and h for a constructor or destructor; constructors are used to build terms, whereas destructors
are used to manipulate terms in expressions. Thus, terms range over names, variables, and applications of
constructors to terms, and expressions allow applications of function symbols to expressions (Figure 1).
We use metavariables u and w to range over both names and variables. Substitutions {M/x} replace x
with M. Arbitrarily large substitutions can be written as {M1/x1, . . . , Mn/xn} and the letters σ and τ range
over substitutions. We write Mσ for the result of applying σ to the variables of M. Similarly, renamings
{u/w} replace w with u, where u and w are both names or both variables.
The semantics of a destructor g of arity l are given by a finite set def(g) of rewrite rules
g(M′1, . . . ,M′l) → M′, where M′1, . . . ,M′l ,M′ are terms that contain only constructors and variables,
the variables of M′ must be bound in M′1, . . . ,M′l , and variables are subject to renaming. The evaluation
of expression g(M1, . . . ,Ml) succeeds if there exists a rewrite rule g(M′1, . . . ,M′l) → M′ in def(g) and
a substitution σ such that Mi = M′iσ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, and in this case g(M1, . . . ,Ml) evaluates to
M′σ. In order to avoid distinguishing constructors and destructors in the semantics of expressions, we
let def( f ) be { f (x1, . . . , xl)→ f (x1, . . . , xl)}, where f is a constructor of arity l. In particular, we use n-
ary constructors (M1, . . . ,Mn) for tuples, and unary destructors pii,n for projections, with the rewrite rule
pii,n((x1, . . . , xn)) → xi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. ProVerif supports both rewrite rules and equations [22];
we omit equations in this paper for simplicity. Our proofs can be extended to equations, and our imple-
mentation supports them1.
The grammar for processes is presented in Figure 1. The process let x = D in P else Q tries to eval-
uate D; if this succeeds, then x is bound to the result and P is executed, otherwise, Q is executed. We
define the conditional if M = N then P else Q as let x = eq(M,N) in P else Q, where x is a fresh vari-
able, eq is a binary destructor, and def(eq) = {eq(y, y) → y}; we always include eq in our set of
function symbols. The else branches may be omitted when Q is the null process. The rest of the syntax
is standard (see [8, 22, 48]), except for barriers, which we explain next.
Our syntax allows processes to contain barriers t:: P, where t ∈ N. Intuitively, t:: P blocks P until
all processes running in parallel are ready to synchronise at barrier t. In addition, barriers are ordered,
so t:: P is also blocked if there are any barriers t′ such that t′ < t. Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet [22,
Section 8] also introduced a notion of synchronisation, named stages. A stage synchronisation can occur
at any point, by dropping processes that did not complete the previous stage. By comparison, a barrier
synchronisation cannot drop processes. For example, in the process c〈k〉.1:: c〈m〉 | 1:: c〈n〉, the barrier
synchronisation cannot occur before the output of k. It follows that the process cannot output n without
having previously output k. In contrast, with stage synchronisation, either k is output first, then the
process moves to the next stage, then it may output m and n, or the process immediately moves to the
next stage by dropping c〈k〉.1:: c〈m〉, so it may output n without any other output. Our notion of barrier
is essential when processes must not be dropped. In particular, it is necessary for proving equivalence
1Only a few rules of the operational semantics need to be adapted to equations, as in [46, Section 2.5.1]; the definition of our
compiler and many parts of the proofs remain unchanged. A tricky point is that, with equations, the evaluation of expressions
may introduce names that do not appear in the initial expression, and these names may collide with other names. There are
several ways to solve this technical issue, either by considering a representative in which these names are renamed to avoid
such collisions or by restricting ourselves to the equational theories that ProVerif supports, in which the equations can be
oriented to avoid such introduction of names. Adapting the proofs to equations is otherwise straightforward.
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Fig. 1. Syntax for terms and processes
M,N ::= terms
a, b, c, . . . , k, . . . ,m, n, . . . , s name
x, y, z variable
f (M1, . . . ,Ml) constructor application
D ::= expressions
M term
h(D1, . . . ,Dl) function evaluation
P,Q,R ::= processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
ν a.P name restriction
M(x).P message input
M〈N〉.P message output
let x = D in P else Q expression evaluation
t:: P barrier
properties that require swapping data between two processes, because we must not drop one of these
processes.
Given a process P, the multiset barriers(P) collects all barriers that occur in P. Thus, barriers(t::Q) =
{t} ∪ barriers(Q) and in all other cases, barriers(P) is the multiset union of the barriers of the im-
mediate subprocesses of P. We naturally extend the function barriers to multisets P of processes by
barriers(P) = ⋃P∈P barriers(P). For each barrier t, the number of processes that must synchronise
is equal to the number of elements t in barriers(P). It follows that the number of barriers which must
be reached is defined in advance of execution, and thus branching behaviour may cause blocking. For
example, the process c(x).if x = k then 1:: c〈m〉 else c〈n〉 | 1:: c〈s〉 contains two barriers that must syn-
chronise. However, when the term bound to x is not k, the else branch is taken and one of the barriers is
dropped, so only one barrier remains. In this case, barrier synchronisation blocks forever, and the pro-
cess never outputs s. The occurrence of barriers under replication is explicitly forbidden, because with
barriers under replication, the number of barriers that we need to synchronise is ill-defined. We partly
overcome this limitation in Section 3.5.1.
The scope of names and variables is delimited by binders ν n, M(x), and let x = D in. The set of
free names fn(P) contains every name n in P which is not under the scope of the binder ν n. The set
of free variables fv(P) contains every variable x in P which is not under the scope of a message input
M(x) or an expression evaluation let x = D in. Using similar notation, the set of names in a term M
is denoted fn(M) and the set of variables in a term M is denoted fv(M). We naturally extend these
functions to multisets P of processes by fn(P) = ⋃P∈P fn(P) and fv(P) = ⋃P∈P fv(P). A term M
is ground if fv(M) = ∅, a substitution {M/x} is ground if M is ground, and a process P is closed if
fv(P) = ∅. Processes are considered equal modulo renaming of bound names and variables. As usual,
substitutions avoid name and variable capture, by first renaming bound names and variables to fresh
names and variables, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Operational semantics
M ⇓ M (M is a term, so it does not contain destructors)
h(D1, . . . ,Dl) ⇓ Nσ if
there exist h(N1, . . . ,Nl)→ N ∈ def(h) and σ such that
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we have Di ⇓ Mi and Mi = Niσ
B, E,P ∪ {0} → B, E,P (RED NIL)
B, E,P ∪ {P | Q} → B, E,P ∪ {P,Q} (RED PAR)
B, E,P ∪ {!P} → B, E,P ∪ {P, !P} (RED REPL)
B, E,P ∪ {ν n.P} → B, E ∪ {n′},P ∪ {P{n′/n}}
for some name n′ such that n′ 6∈ E ∪ fn(P ∪ {ν n.P})
(RED RES)
B, E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N(x).Q} → B, E,P ∪ {P,Q{M/x}} (RED I/O)
B, E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} → B, E,P ∪ {P{M/x}}
if D ⇓ M (RED DESTR 1)
B, E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} → B, E,P ∪ {Q}
if there is no M such that D ⇓ M (RED DESTR 2)
B, E,P ∪ {t:: P1, . . . , t:: Pn} → B\{tn}, E,P ∪ {P1, . . . , Pn}
if n > 1 and for all t′ such that t′ 6 t, we have t′ 6∈ B\{tn},
where tn denotes n copies of t.
(RED BAR)
The operational semantics is defined by reduction (→) on configurations. A configuration C is a triple
B, E,P , where B is a finite multiset of integers, E is a finite set of names, and P is a finite multiset
of closed processes. The multiset B contains the barriers that control the synchronisation of processes
in P . The set E is initially empty and is extended to include any names introduced during reduction,
namely, those names introduced by (RED RES). When E = {a˜} and P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, the configura-
tion B, E,P intuitively stands for ν a˜.(P1 | · · · | Pn). We consider configurations as equal modulo any
renaming of the names in E,P that leaves fn(P) \ E unchanged. The initial configuration for a closed
process P is Cinit(P) = barriers(P), ∅, {P}. Figure 2 defines reduction rules for each construct of the
language. The rule (RED REPL) creates a new copy of the replicated process P. The rule (RED RES)
reduces ν n by creating a fresh name n′, adding it to E, and substituting it for n. The rule (RED I/O)
performs communication: the term M sent by N〈M〉.P is received by N(x).Q, and substituted for x. The
rules (RED DESTR 1) and (RED DESTR 2) treat expression evaluations. They first evaluate D, using the
relation D ⇓ M, which means that the expression D evaluates to the term M, and is also defined in Fig-
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ure 2. When this evaluation succeeds, (RED DESTR 1) substitutes the result M for x and runs P. When
it fails, (RED DESTR 2) runs Q. Finally, the new rule (RED BAR) performs barrier synchronisation: it
synchronises on the lowest barrier t in B. If t occurs n times in B, it requires n processes t:: P1, . . . , t:: Pn
to be ready to synchronise, and in this case, it removes barrier t both from B and from these processes,
which can then further reduce. A configuration B, E,P is valid when barriers(P) ⊆ B. It is easy to check
that the initial configuration is valid and that validity is preserved by reduction. We shall only manipulate
valid configurations.
Example 4. Let us consider the parallel composition of processes P = c〈k〉.1:: c(x), Q = ν n.1:: c〈n〉,
and R = c(x), which yields the initial configuration {12}, ∅, {P | Q | R}, since the process P | Q | R
contains two barriers 1. We have
{12}, ∅, {P | Q | R} −→ {12}, ∅, {P, Q | R} by (RED PAR)
−→ {12}, ∅, {P, Q, R} by (RED PAR)
−→ {12}, ∅, {1:: c(x), Q, 0} by (RED I/O)
−→ {12}, ∅, {1:: c(x), Q} by (RED NIL)
−→ {12}, {n′}, {1:: c(x), 1:: c〈n′〉} by (RED RES)
−→ ∅, {n′}, {c(x), c〈n′〉} by (RED BAR)
−→ ∅, {n′}, {0, 0} by (RED I/O)
−→ ∅, {n′}, {0} by (RED NIL)
−→ ∅, {n′}, ∅ by (RED NIL)
First, the parallel compositions are expanded (by (RED PAR)), then process P sends k to process R, on
channel c (first reduction (RED I/O)), and a fresh name n′ is created by reducing ν n (by (RED RES)).
These steps must happen before barrier synchronisation, by (RED BAR). After that synchronisation, the
communication between c(x) and c〈n′〉 can happen (second reduction (RED I/O)).
The semantics permits synchronisation on barrier t, immediately followed by synchronisation on bar-
rier t + 1. For instance, {12, 2}, ∅, {1:: c(x) | 1:: c〈n〉 | 2:: c〈m〉} reduces to ∅, ∅, {c(x), c〈n〉, c〈m〉} (by
(RED PAR) twice and (RED BAR) twice). Hence, communication between c(x) and c〈n〉, or c(x) and
c〈m〉 is possible. To prevent the latter communication, process 1:: c(x).2:: 0 | 1:: c〈n〉.2:: 0 | 2:: c〈m〉 can
be considered.
2.2. Observational equivalence
Intuitively, configurations C and C′ are observationally equivalent if they can output on the same
channels in the presence of any adversary. Formally, we adapt the definition of observational equivalence
by Arapinis et al. [49] to consider barriers rather than mutable state. We define a context C[_] to be
a process with a hole. We obtain C[P] as the result of filling C[_]’s hole with process P. We define
adversarial contexts as contexts ν n˜.(_ | Q) with fv(Q) = ∅ and barriers(Q) = ∅. When C = B, E,P and
C[_] = ν n˜.(_ | Q) is an adversarial context, we define C[C] = B, E ∪ {n˜},P ∪ {Q}, after renaming the
names in E,P so that E ∩ fn(Q) = ∅. A configuration C = B, E,P can output on a channel N, denoted,
C ↓N , if there exists N〈M〉.P ∈ P with fn(N) ∩ E = ∅, for some term M and process P.
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Fig. 3. Generalised semantics for biprocesses
B, E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N′(x).Q} → B, E,P ∪ {P,Q{M/x}}
if fst(N) = fst(N′) and snd(N) = snd(N′)
(RED I/O)
B, E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} → B, E,P ∪ {P{diff[M,M′]/x}}
if fst(D) ⇓ M and snd(D) ⇓ M′
(RED DESTR 1)
B, E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} → B, E,P ∪ {Q}
if there is no M such that fst(D) ⇓ M
and no M′ such that snd(D) ⇓ M′
(RED DESTR 2)
Definition 1 (Observational equivalence). Observational equivalence between configurations ≈ is the
largest symmetric relationR between valid configurations such that C R C′ implies:
(1) for all N, if C ↓N , then C′ −→∗ C′′ and C′′ ↓N for some C′′;
(2) if C → C1, then C′ →∗ C′1 and C1 R C′1 for some C′1.
(3) C[C] R C[C′] for all adversarial contexts C[_].
Closed processes P and P′ are observationally equivalent, denoted P ≈ P′, if Cinit(P) ≈ Cinit(P′).
The definition first formulates observational equivalence on semantic configurations. Item 1 guarantees
that, if a configuration C outputs on a public channel, then so does C′. Item 2 guarantees that this property
is preserved by reduction, and Item 3 guarantees that it is preserved in the presence of any adversary.
Finally, observational equivalence is formulated on closed processes.
2.3. Biprocesses
The calculus defines syntax to model pairs of processes that have the same structure and differ only by
the terms that they contain. We call such a pair of processes a biprocess. The grammar for biprocesses is
an extension of Figure 1, with additional cases so that diff[M,M′] is a term and diff[D,D′] is an expression.
(We occasionally refer to processes and biprocesses as processes when it is clear from the context.)
Given a biprocess P, we define processes fst(P) and snd(P) as follows: fst(P) is obtained by replacing
all occurrences of diff[M,M′] with M and snd(P) is obtained by replacing diff[M,M′] with M′. We
define fst(D), fst(M), snd(D), and snd(M) similarly, and naturally extend these functions to multisets
of biprocesses by fst(P) = {fst(P) | P ∈ P} and snd(P) = {snd(P) | P ∈ P}, and to configurations
by fst(B, E,P) = B, E, fst(P) and snd(B, E,P) = B, E, snd(P). The standard definitions of barriers,
free names, and free variables apply to biprocesses as well. Adversarial contexts do not contain diff.
Observational equivalence can be formalised as a property of biprocesses:
Definition 2. A closed biprocess P satisfies observational equivalence if fst(P) ≈ snd(P).
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Fig. 4. Semantics for divergence
B, E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N′(x).Q} ↑
if (fst(N) = fst(N′)) 6⇔ (snd(N) = snd(N′))
(DIV I/O)
B, E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} ↑
if (∃M.fst(D) ⇓ M) 6⇔ (∃M′.snd(D) ⇓ M′) (DIV DESTR)
The semantics for biprocesses includes the rules in Figure 2, except for (RED I/O), (RED DESTR 1),
and (RED DESTR 2) which are revised in Figure 3. It follows from this semantics that, if C −→ C′,
then fst(C) −→ fst(C′) and snd(C) −→ snd(C′). In other words, a biprocess reduces when the two
underlying processes reduce in the same way. However, reductions in fst(C) or snd(C) do not nec-
essarily imply reductions in C, that is, there exist configurations C such that fst(C) −→ fst(C′), but
there is no such reduction C −→ C′, and symmetrically for snd(C). For example, given the config-
uration C = ∅, ∅, {diff[a, c]〈n〉.0, a(x).0}, we have fst(C) −→ ∅, ∅, {0, 0}, but there is no reduction
C −→ ∅, ∅, {0, 0}. Formally, this behaviour can be captured using the divergence relation (↑) for con-
figurations (Figure 4) [25]. Divergence can occur because either: i) one process can perform a com-
munication and the other cannot, by rule (DIV I/O); or ii) the evaluation of an expression succeeds in
one process and fails in the other, by rule (DIV DESTR). Using the notion of diff-equivalence (Defi-
nition 3), Theorem 1 shows that a biprocess P satisfies observational equivalence when reductions in
C[Cinit(fst(P))] or C[Cinit(snd(P))] imply reductions in C[Cinit(P)] for all adversarial contexts C[_], that
is, configurations obtained from C[Cinit(P)] never diverge.
Definition 3 (Diff-equivalence). A closed biprocess P satisfies diff-equivalence if for all adversarial
contexts C[_], there is no configuration C such that C[Cinit(P)] −→∗ C and C ↑.
Theorem 1. Let P be a closed biprocess without barriers. If P satisfies diff-equivalence, then P satisfies
observational equivalence.
Theorem 1 can be proved by easily adapting the result of Blanchet [46, Theorem 3.5]. This result itself
adapts the result of Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet [22, Theorem 1], initially presented with a semantics
based on structural equivalence and reduction, to a semantics based on reduction on configurations.
Example 5. Let us revisit Example 1. Formally, the biprocess P = c〈diff[v, v′]〉 | c〈diff[v′, v]〉 does not
satisfy diff-equivalence, because the context C[_] = _ | c(x).if x = v then c〈n〉 causes divergence:
C[Cinit(P)] = ∅, ∅, {c〈diff[v, v′]〉 | c〈diff[v′, v]〉, c(x).if x = v then c〈n〉}
−→∗ C = ∅, ∅, {0, c〈diff[v′, v]〉, if diff[v, v′] = v then c〈n〉}
by (RED PAR) and (RED I/O), and C ↑ by (DIV DESTR). (Recall that the conditional is encoded as a
destructor application.)
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We can revisit Example 3 similarly. The biprocess Pex = c〈A〉.1:: c〈diff[v, v′]〉 | c〈B〉.1:: c〈diff[v′, v]〉
does not satisfy diff-equivalence, because the context C[_] = _ | c(x).c(y).c(z).if z = v then c〈n〉 causes
divergence:
C[Cinit(P)] = {12}, ∅, {Pex, c(x).c(y).c(z).if z = v then c〈n〉}
−→∗ {12}, ∅, {1:: c〈diff[v, v′]〉, 1:: c〈diff[v′, v]〉, c(z).if z = v then c〈n〉}
by (RED PAR) and (RED I/O) twice
−→ ∅, ∅, {c〈diff[v, v′]〉, c〈diff[v′, v]〉, c(z).if z = v then c〈n〉} by (RED BAR)
−→ C = ∅, ∅, {0, c〈diff[v′, v]〉, if diff[v, v′] = v then c〈n〉} by (RED I/O)
and C ↑ as above.
Remark. We do not allow adversarial contexts to contain barriers. In general, allowing them would
enable an adversary to distinguish more processes. For instance, the processes P = c〈n〉.c〈m〉 and Q =
c〈n〉.1:: c〈m〉 are observationally equivalent with our definition, because the barrier 1 can be executed
immediately after outputting n. However, the context C[_] = _ | c(x).c(y).1:: d〈a〉 would distinguish
them: C[Cinit(P)] = {1}, ∅, {c〈n〉.c〈m〉, c(x).c(y).1:: d〈a〉} −→∗ ∅, ∅, {d〈a〉} ↓d, while there is no C such
that C[Cinit(Q)] = {12}, ∅, {c〈n〉.1:: c〈m〉, c(x).c(y).1:: d〈a〉} −→∗ C ↓d because the input c(y) cannot
be reduced. In contrast, for trace properties, including diff-equivalence, which is a trace property on
biprocesses, allowing barriers in adversarial contexts does not give more power to the adversary, because
barriers only constrain the possible traces.
3. Automated reasoning
To prove equivalence, we define a compiler from a biprocess (containing barriers) to a set of bipro-
cesses without barriers. The biprocesses in that set permit various swapping strategies. We show that
if one of these biprocesses satisfies diff-equivalence, then the original biprocess satisfies observational
equivalence. The compiler works in two steps:
(1) Function annotate annotates barriers with the data to be swapped and channels for sending and
receiving such data.
(2) Function elim-and-swap translates the biprocess with annotated barriers into biprocesses without
barriers, which encode barriers using communication (inputs and outputs). We exploit this com-
munication to allow swapping, by sending data back to a different barrier.
We introduce annotated barriers (Section 3.1) and define these two steps (Sections 3.2 and 3.3) below. By
combining these two steps we obtain our compiler (Section 3.4), which we have implemented in ProVerif
(http://proverif.inria.fr/), as of version 1.94. The proof of soundness shows that these two steps preserve
the observational behaviour of the biprocesses, so that if a compiled biprocess satisfies observational
equivalence, then so does the initial biprocess.
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3.1. Process calculus with annotated barriers
We introduce an annotated barrier construct t[a, c, ς]:: P, which is not present in the syntax introduced
in Section 2, but is used by our compiler. In this construct, a and c are distinct channel names: channel
a will be used for sending swappable data, and channel c for receiving swapped data.2 Moreover, the
ordered substitution ς = (M1/x1, . . . , Mn/xn) collects swappable data M1, . . . ,Mn and associates these
terms with variables x1, . . . , xn; the process P uses these variables instead of the terms M1, . . . ,Mn. The
ordered substitution ς is similar to a substitution, except that the elements M1/x1, . . . , Mn/xn are ordered.
(We indicate ordering using parentheses instead of braces.) The ordering is used to designate each vari-
able in the domain unambiguously. We define dom(ς) = {x1, . . . , xn} and range(ς) = {M1, . . . ,Mn}. As
usual, we require that fv(range(ς)) ∩ dom(ς) = ∅. The annotated barrier t[a, c, ς]:: P binds the variables
in the domain of ς in P, so we extend the functions fn and fv to annotated barriers as follows:
fn(t[a, c, ς]:: P) = {a, c} ∪ fn(range(ς)) ∪ fn(P)
fv(t[a, c, ς]:: P) = fv(range(ς)) ∪ (fv(P) \ dom(ς))
We define the ordered domain of ς, ordom(ς) = (x1, . . . , xn), as the tuple containing the variables in the
domain of ς, in the same order as in the definition of ς.
We also introduce a domain-barrier construct t[a, c, x˜]:: P, which is similar to an annotated barrier
except that the ordered substitution ς is replaced with a tuple of variables x˜ = (x1, . . . , xn) correspond-
ing to the ordered domain of ς. Domain-barriers occur in barriers(P), but not in processes. We extend
function barriers to annotated barriers as follows:
barriers(t[a, c, ς]:: P) = {t[a, c, ordom(ς)]:: P} ∪ barriers(P)
Hence, function barriers maps processes to multisets of domain-barriers and integers, and domain-
barriers include the process that follows the barrier itself. In addition, we extend fst and snd for configu-
rations as follows: fst(t[a, c, x˜]:: P) = t[a, c, x˜]:: fst(P) and fst(B, E,P) = fst(B), E, fst(P), and similarly
for snd.
We introduce the function channels(B) = {a | t[a, c, x˜]:: P ∈ B} ∪ {c | t[a, c, x˜]:: P ∈ B} to re-
cover the multiset of names used by the domain-barriers in B. We implicitly cast channels(B) into
a set when we take the intersection with a set, test the inclusion with a set, or use it as a set of
names E inside a configuration B, E,P . We also define the function fn-nobc, which returns the free
names excluding the channels of barriers, by fn-nobc(t[a, c, ς]:: P) = fn(range(ς)) ∪ fn-nobc(P) and,
for all other processes, fn-nobc(P) is defined inductively like fn(P). (The acronym “nobc” stands for
“no barrier channels”.) The initial configuration for a closed process P with annotated barriers is
Cinit(P) = barriers(P), channels(barriers(P)), {P}. We consider configurations B, E,P with annotated
barriers as equal modulo any renaming of the names in B, E,P that leaves fn(P) \ E unchanged.
We introduce the following validity condition to ensure that channels of annotated barriers are not
mixed with other names: they are fresh names when they are introduced by barrier annotation (Sec-
tion 3.2); they should remain pairwise distinct and distinct from other names. Their scope is global, but
they are private, that is, the adversary does not have access to them.
2The use of distinct channels helps avoid an incompleteness issue of ProVerif. In essence, ProVerif overapproximates a
private channel as a set of messages: an input on a private channel a may receive any message sent on a at any point, in any
order. By using distinct channels for barriers, we make sure that there is a single output and a single input for each private
channel, so we reduce the effect of this overapproximation to a minimum.
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Definition 4 (Validity). A process P is valid if it is closed, channels(barriers(P)) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅, the
elements of channels(barriers(P)) are pairwise distinct, and for all annotated barriers in P such that
P = C[t[a, c, ς]::Q], we have fv(Q) ⊆ dom(ς) and C[_] does not bind a, c, nor the names in fn(Q) above
the hole.
A configuration B, E,P is valid if barriers(P) ⊆ B, channels(B) ⊆ E, all processes in P are valid,
the elements of channels(B) are pairwise distinct, and channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅.
Validity guarantees that channels used in annotated barriers are pairwise distinct (the elements of
channels(barriers(P)) are pairwise distinct; the elements of channels(B) are pairwise distinct), distinct
from other names (channels(barriers(P)) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅; channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅), and free
in the processes (for all annotated barriers in P such that P = C[t[a, c, ς]::Q], C[_] does not bind a nor
c above the hole). These channels must be in E (channels(B) ⊆ E), which corresponds to the intuition
that they are global but private. Furthermore, for each annotated barrier t[a, c, ς]::Q, we require that
fv(Q) ⊆ dom(ς) and the names in fn(Q) are not bound above the barrier, that is, they are global. This
requirement ensures that the local state of the process t[a, c, ς]::Q is contained in the ordered substitution
ς. The process Q refers to this state using variables in dom(ς). We consider only valid configurations;
Lemma 2 below justifies this point.
The operational semantics for processes with both standard and annotated barriers extends the seman-
tics for processes with only standard barriers, with the following rule:
B, E,P ∪ {t:: P1, . . . , t:: Pm, t[am+1, cm+1, ςm+1]:: Pm+1, . . . , t[an, cn, ςn]:: Pn}
→ B′, E,P ∪ {P1, . . . , Pm, Pm+1ςm+1, . . . , Pnςn} (RED BAR’)
where 0 6 m 6 n, 1 6 n, B = {tm, t[am+1, cm+1, ordom(ςm+1)]:: Pm+1, . . . , t[an, cn, ordom(ςn)]:: Pn} ∪
B′, and for all t′ such that t′ 6 t, t′ does not appear in B′, i.e., t′ /∈ B′ and t′[_]:: _ /∈ B′. When all barriers
are standard, this rule reduces to (RED BAR).
The next lemma allows us to show that all considered configurations are valid.
Lemma 2. If P is a valid process, then Cinit(P) is valid. Validity is preserved by reduction, by application
of an adversarial context, and by application of fst and snd.
The proof of Lemma 2 is detailed in Appendix A.
We refer to processes in which all barriers are annotated as annotated processes, and processes in
which all barriers are standard as standard processes.
3.2. Barrier annotation
Next, we define the first step of our compiler, which annotates barriers with additional information.
Definition 5. We define function annotate, from standard processes to annotated processes, as follows:
annotate transforms C[t::Q] into C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′], where C[_] is any context without replication above
the hole, a and c are distinct fresh names, and (Q′, ς) = split(Q), where the function split is defined
below. The transformations are performed until all barriers are annotated, in a top-down order, so that
in the transformation above, all barriers above t::Q are already annotated and barriers inside Q are
standard.
14 B. Blanchet & B. Smyth / Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers
The function split is defined by split(Q) = (Q′, ς) where Q′ is a process and ς = (M1/x1, . . . , Mn/xn)
is an ordered substitution such that terms M1, . . . ,Mn are the largest subterms of Q that do not contain
names or variables bound in Q, variables x1, . . . , xn are fresh, and process Q′ is obtained from Q by
replacing each Mi with xi, so that Q = Q′ς. Moreover, the variables x1, . . . , xn occur in this order in Q′
when read from left to right.
Intuitively, the function split separates a process Q into its “skeleton” Q′ (a process with variables as
placeholders for data) and associated data in the ordered substitution ς. Such data can be swapped with
another process that has the same skeleton. The ordering of x1, . . . , xn chosen in the definition of split
guarantees that the ordering of variables in the domain of ς is consistent among the various subprocesses.
This ordering of variables and the fact that M1, . . . ,Mn are the largest possible subterms allows the
checks in the definition of our compiler (see definition of function swapper in Section 3.3) to succeed
more often, and hence increases opportunities for swapping.
Example 6. We have
split(c〈diff[v, v′]〉) = (x〈y〉, (c/x, diff[v, v′]/y))
split(c〈diff[v′, v]〉) = (x′〈y′〉, (c/x′, diff[v′, v]/y′))
The process c〈diff[v, v′]〉 is separated into its skeleton Q′ = x〈y〉 and the ordered substitution ς = (c/x,
diff[v, v′]/y), which defines the values of the variables x and y such that c〈diff[v, v′]〉 = Q′ς. The process
c〈diff[v′, v]〉 is separated similarly. Using these results, annotate(Pex) is defined as
c〈A〉.1[a, b, (c/x, diff[v, v′]/y)]:: x〈y〉 | c〈B〉.1[a′, b′, (c/x′, diff[v′, v]/y′)]:: x′〈y′〉
where a, a′, b, b′ are fresh names. That is, annotate(Pex) is derived by annotating the two barriers in Pex.
(Process Pex is given in Example 3.)
The function split can also be formally defined as split(Q) = split(∅,Q) with the definition of
split(U,Q) by structural induction on Q given in Figure 5. In that definition, we use contexts with
multiple holes. All inductive cases for terms, expressions, and processes have the same form, so we
exceptionally use the same notation Q for a term, an expression, and a process. Assuming we initially
call split(∅,Q0), in each recursive call split(U,Q), the set U contains all bound names and variables at
the subprocess Q in Q0. Each call to split(U,Q) returns (Q′, ς) where Q′ is obtained from Q by replacing
the largest subterms Mi of Q that do not contain names or variables in U or previously bound in Q with
fresh variables xi, and recording the replacement in the ordered substitution ς = (M1/x1, . . . , Mn/xn).
When Q is a term M, split(U,Q) = split(U,M) behaves as follows
• If M does not contain names or variables in U, then M is replaced with a fresh variable x, and the
replacement is recorded in ς = (M/x), hence split(U,M) = (x, (M/x)) (rule R1 of Figure 5).
• If M is a variable in U, then it is left unchanged, hence split(U, u) = (u, ∅) (rule R2).
• If M is a constructor application M = f (M1, . . . ,Mn) that contains names or variables in U,
then we cannot replace M itself with a variable, but we perform the replacement on the largest
possible subterms of M by induction: split(U,M) = ( f (M′1, . . . ,M′n), ς1 + · · · + ςn) where for
all i 6 n, split(U,Mi) = (M′i , ςi) (rule R3 with context 9). If M is a constructor application
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Fig. 5. Helper function for barrier annotation
R1. split(U,M) = (x, (M/x)) where x is a fresh variable, if (fv(M) ∪ fn(M)) ∩ U = ∅
R2. split(U, u) = (u, ∅) if u ∈ U
R3. split(U,C[Q1, . . . ,Qn]) = (C[Q′1, . . . ,Q
′
n], ς) where
for all i 6 n, split(U ∪ Ui,Qi) = (Q′i, ςi)
C[_, . . . , _] binds the names and variables in Ui above the i-th hole
ς = ς1 + · · ·+ ςn, where
(M1/x1, . . . , Mn/xn) + (Mn+1/xn+1, . . . , Mm/xm) = (M1/x1, . . . , Mm/xm)
Qi may be a term, an expression, or a process
C[_, . . . , _] is one of the following contexts:
1. 0 6. [_]〈[_]〉.[_]
2. [_] | [_] 7. let x = [_] in [_] else [_]
3. ![_] 8. t:: [_]
4. ν a.[_] 9. h([_], . . . , [_]) (h is a constructor or a destructor)
5. [_](x).[_] 10. diff[[_], [_]]
for i 6 n, Ui is computed as follows depending on the context C[_, . . . , _]:
– for context 4, U1 = {a}, since context 4 binds a above its hole;
– for contexts 5 and 7, U2 = {x} since these contexts bind x above their second hole;
– in all other cases, Ui = ∅.
Rule R3 is applied with context 9 or 10 only when rule R1 does not apply.
M = f (M1, . . . ,Mn) that does not contains names or variables in U, then we always apply rule R1
as mentioned in the first item and never apply rule R3. (As written in Figure 5, rule R3 is applied
with context 9 only when rule R1 does not apply.) The case in which M = diff[M1,M2] is similar,
using context 10.
For an expression or process Q, we proceed by induction using the third rule of Figure 5, and after
several recursive calls, we apply split to each term contained in Q.
For soundness of the transformation (Proposition 5), it is sufficient that:
Lemma 3. If (Q′, ς) = split(Q), then Q = Q′ς, fv(Q′) = dom(ς), and fn(Q′) = ∅.
This lemma is an immediate corollary of the following result:
Lemma 4. Let Q be a term, an expression, or a process. If (Q′, ς) = split(U,Q), then Q′ς = Q,
(fv(range(ς)) ∪ fn(range(ς))) ∩ U = ∅, dom(ς) ⊆ fv(Q′) ⊆ dom(ς) ∪ U, fn(Q′) ⊆ U, and dom(ς)
consists of fresh variables.
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Lemma 4 is proved in Appendix B by induction of Q, following the definition of split in Figure 5.
Intuitively, when reducing the annotated barrier by (RED BAR’), we reduce t[a, c, ς]::Q′ to Q′ς, which
is equal to Q by Lemma 3, so we recover the process Q we had before annotation. The conditions that
fv(Q′) = dom(ς) and fn(Q′) = ∅ show that no names and variables are free in Q′ and bound above the
barrier, thus substitution ς contains the whole state of the process Q = Q′ς.
The following proposition shows that annotation does not alter the semantics of processes:
Proposition 5. If P0 is a closed standard biprocess and P′0 = annotate(P0), then P′0 is valid, fst(P′0) ≈
fst(P0), and snd(P′0) ≈ snd(P0).
Proof sketch. The main step of the proof consists in showing that, whenC[t:: Pς] andC[t[a, c, ς]:: P] are
valid processes, we haveC[t:: Pς] ≈ C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]. This proof is performed by defining a relationR that
satisfies the conditions of Definition 1. By Lemma 3, from the annotated biprocess P′0, we can rebuild
the initial process P0 by replacing each occurrence of an annotated barrier t[a, c, ς]::Q with t::Qς, so
the same replacement also transforms fst(P′0) into fst(P0) and snd(P′0) into snd(P0). By C[t:: Pς] ≈
C[t[a, c, ς]:: P], this replacement preserves the observational behaviour of the processes. This proof is
detailed in Appendix C. 
3.3. Barrier elimination and swapping
Next, we define the second step of our compiler, which translates an annotated biprocess into bipro-
cesses without barriers. Each annotated barrier t[ai, ci, ςi] (1 6 i 6 n) is eliminated by replacing it with
an output on channel ai of swappable data, followed by an input on channel ci that receives swapped
data. A swapping process is added in parallel, which receives the swappable data on channels a1, . . . , an
for all barriers t, before sending swapped data on channels c1, . . . , cn. Therefore, all inputs on channels
a1, . . . , an must be received before the outputs on channels c1, . . . , cn are sent and the processes that
follow the barriers can proceed, thus the synchronisation between the barriers is guaranteed. Moreover,
the swapping process may permute data, sending on channel ci data that comes from channel a j with
j 6= i, thus implementing swapping. This swapping is allowed only when the processes that follow the
barriers are identical (up to renaming of some channel names and variables), so that swapping preserves
the observational behaviour of the processes. We detail this construction below.
3.3.1. Barrier elimination
First, we eliminate barriers.
Definition 6. The function bar-elim removes annotated barriers, by transforming each annotated bar-
rier t[a, c, (M1/z1, . . . , Mn/zn)]::Q into a〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉.c(z).let z1 = pi1,n(z) in · · · let zn = pin,n(z) in Q,
where z is a fresh variable.
The definition of function bar-elim ensures that, if the message (M1, . . . ,Mn) on the private channel a
is simply forwarded to the private channel c, then the process derived by application of bar-elim binds zi
to Mi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, like the annotated barrier, so the original process and the process derived
by application bar-elim are observationally equivalent. Intuitively, the private channel communication
provides an opportunity to swap data. The function bar-elim is defined more formally in Figure 6, by
induction on the syntax.
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Fig. 6. Definition of bar-elim
bar-elim(0) = 0
bar-elim(Q | R) = bar-elim(Q) | bar-elim(R)
bar-elim(!Q) = !bar-elim(Q)
bar-elim(ν n.Q) = ν n.bar-elim(Q)
bar-elim(M(x).Q) = M(x).bar-elim(Q)
bar-elim(M〈N〉.Q) = M〈N〉.bar-elim(Q)
bar-elim(let x = D in Q else R) = let x = D in bar-elim(Q) else bar-elim(R)
bar-elim(t[a, c, (M1/z1, . . . , Mn/zn)]::Q) = a〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉.c(z).let z1 = pi1,n(z) in · · ·
let zn = pin,n(z) in bar-elim(Q)
where z is a fresh variable
Example 7. Using the results of Example 6, eliminating barriers from annotate(Pex) yields bar-elim(
annotate(Pex)) = Pcomp | P′comp, where
Pcomp = c〈A〉.a〈(c, diff[v, v′])〉.b(z).let x = pi1,2(z) in let y = pi2,2(z) in x〈y〉
P′comp = c〈B〉.a′〈(c, diff[v′, v])〉.b′(z′).let x′ = pi1,2(z′) in let y′ = pi2,2(z′) in x′〈y′〉
for some fresh variables z and z′.
3.3.2. Swapping
Next, we define swapping strategies.
Definition 7. The function swapper is defined over multisets B as follows: if B = ∅, then swapper(B) =
{0}; otherwise,
swapper(B) ={
a1(x1) . · · · . an(xn).c1〈diff[x1, x f (1)]〉 . · · · . cn〈diff[xn, x f (n)]〉.R
∣∣
B = {t[a1, c1, z˜1]::Q1, . . . , t[an, cn, z˜n]::Qn} ∪ B′ where t′ > t for all t′[a, c, z˜]::Q ∈ B′;
function f is a permutation on {1, . . . , n} such that Ql/z˜l =ch Q f (l)/z˜ f (l) for all 1 6 l 6 n;
R ∈ swapper(B′); and x1, . . . , xn are fresh variables
}
where =ch is defined as follows:
• Q =ch Q′ means that Q equals Q′ modulo renaming of channels of annotated barriers and
• Q/z˜ =ch Q′/z˜′ means that z˜ = (z1, . . . , zk) and z˜′ = (z′1, . . . , z′k) for some integer k, and
Q{y1/z1, . . . , yk/zk} =ch Q′{y1/z′1, . . . , yk/z′k} for some fresh variables y1, . . . , yk.
The function swapper builds a set of processes from a multiset of domain-barriers B as follows. We
identify integer t ∈ N and domain-barriers t[a1, c1, z˜1]::Q1, . . . , t[an, cn, z˜n]::Qn in B such that no other
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barriers with t′ 6 t appear in B, so that these barriers are reduced before other barriers in B. Among
these barriers, we consider barriers t[ai, ci, z˜i]::Qi and t[a j, c j, z˜ j]::Q j such that Qi/z˜i =ch Q j/z˜ j, that is,
the processes Qi and Q j are equal modulo renaming of channels of annotated barriers, after renaming
the variables in z˜i and z˜ j to the same variables, and we allow swapping data between such barriers using
the permutation f . We then construct a set of processes which enable swapping, by receiving data to be
swapped on channels a1, . . . , an, and sending it back on channels c1, . . . , cn, in the same order in the
first component of diff and permuted by f in the second component of diff. The function swapper does
not specify an ordering on the pairs of channels (a1, c1), . . . , (an, cn), since any ordering is correct.
Example 8. We have barriers(annotate(Pex)) = {1[a, b, (x, y)]:: x〈y〉, 1[a′, b′, (x′, y′)]:: x′〈y′〉}. More-
over, we trivially have x〈y〉/(x, y) =ch x〈y〉/(x, y) and x′〈y′〉/(x′, y′) =ch x′〈y′〉/(x′, y′), because
Q/z˜ =ch Q/z˜ for all Q and z˜. We also have x〈y〉/(x, y) =ch x′〈y′〉/(x′, y′), because
x〈y〉{x′′/x, y′′/y} = x′′〈y′′〉 = x′〈y′〉{x′′/x′, y′′/y′}
It follows that swapper(barriers(annotate(Pex))) = {Psame, Pswap}, where
Psame = a(z).a′(z′).b〈diff[z, z]〉.b′〈diff[z′, z′]〉
Pswap = a(z).a′(z′).b〈diff[z, z′]〉.b′〈diff[z′, z]〉
for some fresh variables z and z′. (Note that diff[z, z] could be simplified into z. Similarly, diff[z′, z′] could
be simplified into z′.) This set considers the two possible swapping strategies: the strategy that does not
swap any data and the strategy that swaps data between the two processes at the barrier.
3.3.3. Combining barrier elimination and swapping
Finally, we derive a set of processes by parallel composition of the process output by bar-elim and the
processes output by swapper, under the scope of name restrictions on the fresh channels introduced by
annotate.
elim-and-swap(P) =
{
ν a˜.(bar-elim(P) | R) where B = barriers(P),
{a˜} = channels(B), and R ∈ swapper(B)
}
Intuitively, function elim-and-swap encodes barrier synchronisation and swapping using private channel
communication, thereby preserving the observational behaviour of processes.
Example 9. Using the results of Examples 7 & 8, applying elim-and-swap to the process annotate(Pex)
generates two processes
P1 = ν a, a′, b, b′.(Pcomp | P′comp | Psame)
P2 = ν a, a′, b, b′.(Pcomp | P′comp | Pswap)
In the process P1, no data is swapped, so it behaves exactly like Pex: (c, diff[v, v′]) is sent on a, sent back
on b by Psame as diff[(c, diff[v, v′]), (c, diff[v, v′])] which simplifies into (c, diff[v, v′]), and after evaluating
the projections, Pcomp reduces into c〈diff[v, v′]〉, which is the output present in the process Pex. Similarly,
P′comp reduces into c〈diff[v′, v]〉, present in Pex.
B. Blanchet & B. Smyth / Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers 19
By contrast, in process P2, data is swapped: (c, diff[v, v′]) is sent on a and (c, diff[v′, v]) is sent on
a′, and Pswap sends back diff[(c, diff[v, v′]), (c, diff[v′, v])] on b. The first component of this term is (c, v)
(obtained by taking the first component of each diff), and similarly its second component is also (c, v),
so this term simplifies into (c, v). After evaluating the projections, Pcomp reduces into c〈v〉. Similarly,
P′comp reduces into c〈v′〉. Hence P2 behaves like c〈A〉.1:: c〈v〉 | c〈B〉.1:: c〈v′〉. In particular, P2 outputs
A and B before barrier synchronisation and v and v′ after synchronisation just like Pex. But P2 satisfies
diff-equivalence while Pex does not.
The next proposition formalises the preservation of observable behaviour.
Proposition 6. Let P be a valid, annotated biprocess. If P′ ∈ elim-and-swap(P), then fst(P) ≈ fst(P′)
and snd(P) ≈ snd(P′).
The core argument for the proof of Proposition 6 is the following:
Proposition 7. Suppose P0 is a valid, annotated biprocess. Let C0 = B, E, {P0} and C′0 =
∅, E, {bar-elim(P0),R}, where B = barriers(P0), E = channels(B), and R ∈ swapper(B). We have
fst(C0) ≈ fst(C′0) and snd(C0) ≈ snd(C′0).
In this proposition, the configuration C0 is the initial configuration of the process P0 and the configuration
C′0 is obtained by reducing the restrictions and the parallel composition at the root of a compiled process
in elim-and-swap(P0). The proposition shows that the first components of these two configurations are
observationally equivalent, and so are the second components. The proposition is proved by defining a
relation R that satisfies the conditions of Definition 1. The proof is fairly long and delicate. It relies on
Lemmas 8 and 9, and is detailed in Appendix F.
Lemma 8 proves that bar-elim preserves renaming of names and substitution of terms for variables.
(Our operational semantics uses renaming of names and substitution of terms for variables. Implicitly,
this includes renaming of variables.)
Lemma 8. Given an annotated process P and a substitution or renaming σ, we have bar-elim(P)σ =
bar-elim(Pσ).
This lemma is proved by induction on process P, in Appendix D.
The second lemma builds upon Lemma 8 to show that function bar-elim preserves reduction, in cases
in which barriers are not reduced.
Lemma 9. Suppose B is a finite set of annotated barriers, E is a finite set of names and P ,Q,Q′ are
finite multisets of processes such that barriers(Q′) = ∅. Further suppose that C = B, E,Q∪P is a valid
configuration. Let C′ = ∅, E,Q′ ∪ bar-elim(P). We have the following properties:
(1) If C −→ C1 by reducing one or more processes in P such that C1 = B, E1,Q ∪ P1 for some set of
names E1 and multiset of processes P1, then C′ −→ C′1, where C′1 = ∅, E1,Q′ ∪ bar-elim(P1).
(2) If C′ −→ C′1 by reducing one or more processes in bar-elim(P) such that C′1 = ∅, E1,Q′ ∪ P ′1 for
some set of names E1 and multiset of processes P ′1, then there exists a multiset of processes P1
such that P ′1 = bar-elim(P1) and C −→ C1, where C1 = B, E1,Q∪ P1.
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This lemma is proved by cases on the considered reduction, in Appendix E.
We use two additional propositions in order to prove Proposition 6.
Proposition 10. Let B, E, {ν n.P} ∪ P be a valid configuration, and n′ be a name, where n′ 6∈ E ∪
fn({ν n.P} ∪ P). We have B, E, {ν n.P} ∪ P ≈ B, E ∪ {n′}, {P{n′/n}} ∪ P .
Proposition 11. Let B, E, {P | Q} ∪ P be a valid configuration. We have B, E, {P | Q} ∪ P ≈
B, E, {P,Q} ∪ P .
These propositions follow immediately from the semantics and definition of observational equivalence.
They are proved in Appendix G, by defining a relationR that satisfies the conditions of Definition 1.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows from these results.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let B0 = barriers(P), and {a˜} = channels(B0). By definition of compiler,
there exists a biprocess R ∈ swapper(B0) such that P′ = ν a˜.(bar-elim(P) | R). It follows that
barriers(P′) = ∅, so we have
Cinit(fst(P′)) = ∅, ∅, {fst(P′)}
≈ ∅, {a˜}, {fst(bar-elim(P) | R)} by Proposition 10
≈ ∅, {a˜}, {fst(bar-elim(P)), fst(R)} by Proposition 11
≈ fst(B0), {a˜}, {fst(P)} = Cinit(fst(P)) by Proposition 7
so fst(P′) ≈ fst(P). The proof of snd(P) ≈ snd(P′) is similar. 
3.4. Our compiler
We combine the annotation (Section 3.2) and barrier removal (Section 3.3) steps to define our compiler
as
compiler(P) = elim-and-swap(annotate(P))
We have implemented the compiler in ProVerif, available from: http://proverif.inria.fr/.
By combining Propositions 5 and 6, we immediately obtain:
Corollary 12. Let P be a closed standard biprocess. If P′ ∈ compiler(P), then fst(P) ≈ fst(P′) and
snd(P) ≈ snd(P′).
This corollary shows that compilation preserves the observational behaviour of processes. The following
theorem is an immediate consequence of this corollary:
Theorem 13. Let P be a closed biprocess. If a biprocess in compiler(P) satisfies observational equiva-
lence, then P satisfies observational equivalence.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a biprocess P′ ∈ compiler(P) such that P′ satisfies observational equiv-
alence, that is, fst(P′) ≈ snd(P′). By Corollary 12, fst(P) ≈ fst(P′) and snd(P) ≈ snd(P′), so by
transitivity of ≈, we have fst(P) ≈ snd(P), so P satisfies observational equivalence. 
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This theorem allows us to prove observational equivalence using swapping: we prove that a bipro-
cess in compiler(P) satisfies observational equivalence using ProVerif (by Theorem 1), and conclude
that P satisfies observational equivalence as well. For instance, ProVerif can show that the process
P2 ∈ compiler(Pex) of Example 9 satisfies observational equivalence, thus Pex satisfies observational
equivalence too.
The idea of swapping data at synchronisation points also applies to other tools that prove diff-
equivalence (e.g., Maude-NPA [23] and Tamarin [24]). However, a compiler such as ours is not nec-
essarily needed to implement this idea in these tools. For instance, in Tamarin, the swapping can be done
directly on the multiset representing the state at the synchronisation point [50]. The idea of swapping
could also be applied to other methods of proving equivalence. However, it may be less useful in these
cases, since it might not permit the proof of more equivalences in such cases.
3.5. Extensions
3.5.1. Replicated barriers
While our calculus does not allow barriers under replication, we can still prove equivalence with
barriers under bounded replication, for any bound. We define bounded replication by !nP = P | · · · | P
with n copies of the process P. We have the following results:
Proposition 14. Let C[!Q] be a closed standard biprocess, such that the context C[_] does not contain
any barrier above the hole. If a biprocess in compiler(C[!Q]) satisfies diff-equivalence, then for all n, a
biprocess in compiler(C[!nQ]) satisfies diff-equivalence.
Proposition 14 shows that, if our approach proves equivalence with unbounded replication, then it also
proves equivalence with bounded replication. This proposition and the next one are proved in Ap-
pendix H.
Proposition 15. LetC[Q] be a closed standard biprocess, such that the contextC[_] does not contain any
replication above the hole. If a biprocess in compiler(C[Q]) satisfies diff-equivalence, then a biprocess
in compiler(C[t::Q]) satisfies diff-equivalence.
Proposition 15 shows that, if our approach proves equivalence after removing a barrier, then it also
proves equivalence with the barrier. By combining these two results, we obtain:
Corollary 16. Let Qnobar be obtained from Q by removing all barriers. Let C[_] be a context that does
not contain any replication or barrier above the hole. If a biprocess in compiler(C[!Qnobar]) satisfies
diff-equivalence, then for all n, process C[!nQ] satisfies observational equivalence.
Proof. If a biprocess in compiler(C[!Qnobar]) satisfies diff-equivalence, then by Proposition 14, a bipro-
cess in compiler(C[!nQnobar]) satisfies diff-equivalence. By applying Proposition 15 several times,
a biprocess in compiler(C[!nQ]) satisfies diff-equivalence. Hence, by Theorem 1, a biprocess in
compiler(C[!nQ]) satisfies observational equivalence, and by Theorem 13, C[!nQ] satisfies observational
equivalence. 
Corollary 16 shows that we can apply our compiler to prove observational equivalence for biprocesses
with bounded replication, for any value of the bound. In the context of election schemes, this result
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allows us to prove privacy for an unbounded number of voters. For instance, in the protocol by Lee et
al. (Section 4.2), we consider a process C[!n+2Q] with n + 2 voters each using a process Q, in which
two voters A and B swap their votes. We isolate the processes for the voters A and B, writing the process
C[QA | QB | !nQ]. We keep the barriers in QA and QB (they are typically useful), but remove them in
the other processes !nQ in order to apply Corollary 16: we show that a biprocess in compiler(C[QA |
QB | !Qnobar]) satisfies diff-equivalence, and conclude that for all n, process C[QA | QB | !nQ] satisfies
observational equivalence.
3.5.2. Trace properties
ProVerif also supports the proof of trace properties (reachability and correspondence properties of the
form “if some event has been executed, then some other events must have been executed”, which serve
for formalising authentication) [51]. Our implementation extends this support to processes with barriers,
by compiling them to processes without barriers, and applying ProVerif to the compiled processes. In
this case, swapping does not help, so our compiler does not swap. We do not detail the proof of trace
properties with barriers further, since it is easier and less important than observational equivalence.
3.5.3. Swapping without explicit synchronisation
Our compiler enables swapping at synchronisation points. Swapping can also be performed immedi-
ately under parallel compositions. For instance, in a biprocess C[P1 | · · · | Pn], data could be swapped
between processes P1, . . . , Pn that have the same skeleton, even without explicit synchronisation. We
do not perform this swapping in our compiler for several reasons. First, this case is easy to deal with
manually: by rewriting P1 | · · · | Pn as Q1 | · · · | Qn, where fst(Q1 | · · · | Qn) = fst(P1 | · · · | Pn)
and snd(Q1 | · · · | Qn) is obtained by permuting the parallel processes in snd(P1 | · · · | Pn). Secondly,
such a rewriting is performed by another extension of ProVerif [52, Section 5], to merge processes into
biprocesses in order to prove observational equivalence. Finally, this case would lead to useless swap-
ping opportunities, which would slow down the exploration of all swapping possibilities. If swapping is
desired in this case, it can be obtained in our approach by adding a synchronisation at the beginning of
P1, . . . , Pn.
3.5.4. Future work
Our results could be extended to systems in which several groups of participants synchronise locally
inside each group, but do not synchronise with other groups. For instance, we could consider a voting
system in which voters synchronise at a regional level. In the same direction, we could consider a vehic-
ular network in which vehicles synchronise at the crossroad level (see also Section 4.3). In this case, we
would need several swapping processes similar to those generated by swapper, one for each group.
We could also extend our approach to swap data between processes that have the same skeleton only
until the next synchronisation. In this case, the swapping must be reversed at the next synchronisation, to
recover the initial data. For instance, that would allow us to prove that the biprocess 1:: c〈diff[m, n]〉.2:: 0 |
1:: c〈diff[n,m]〉.2:: c〈n〉 satisfies observational equivalence. (The synchronisation at barrier 1 could be
removed as explained in Section 3.5.3.)
It would also be useful to study heuristics in order to find a successful swapping strategy without
trying all of them. Finally, it would be interesting to study the impact of our compiler on the termination
and on the precision of ProVerif, especially with the usage of private channels to encode synchronisation
and swapping.
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4. Privacy in elections
Elections enable voters to choose representatives. Choices should be made freely, and this has led
to the emergence of ballot secrecy as a de facto standard privacy requirement of elections. Stronger
formulations of privacy, such as receipt-freeness, are also possible.
• Ballot secrecy: a voter’s vote is not revealed to anyone.
• Receipt-freeness: a voter cannot prove how she voted.
We demonstrate the suitability of our approach for analysing privacy requirements of election schemes
by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta (commonly referred to as FOO), by Lee et al., along with some of its
variants, and by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson (commonly referred to as JCJ). Our ProVerif scripts are
included in ProVerif’s documentation package (http://proverif.inria.fr/). The runtime of these scripts
(including compilation of barriers and proof of diff-equivalence by ProVerif) ranges from 0.24 seconds
for FOO to 372 seconds to prove coercion-resistance in JCJ, on an Intel Xeon 3.6 GHz under Linux.
4.1. Case study: FOO
4.1.1. Cryptographic primitives
FOO uses commitments and blind signatures. We model commitment with a binary constructor
commit, and the corresponding destructor open for opening the commitment, with the following rewrite
rule:
open(xk, commit(xk, xplain))→ xplain
Using constructors sign, blind, and pk, we model blind signatures as follows: sign(xsk, xmsg) is the signa-
ture of message xmsg under secret key xsk, blind(xk, xmsg) is the blinding of message xmsg with coins xk,
and pk(xsk) is the public key corresponding to the secret key xsk. We also use three destructors: checksign
to verify signatures, getmsg to model that an adversary may recover the message from the signature, even
without the public key, and unblind for unblinding, defined by the following rewrite rules:
checksign(pk(xsk), sign(xsk, xmsg))→ xmsg
getmsg(sign(xsk, xmsg))→ xmsg
unblind(xk, sign(xsk, blind(xk, xmsg)))→ sign(xsk, xmsg)
unblind(xk, blind(xk, xplain))→ xplain
With blind signatures, a signer may sign a blinded message without learning the plaintext message, and
the signature on the plaintext message can be recovered by unblinding, as shown by the third rewrite
rule.
4.1.2. Protocol description
The protocol uses two authorities, a registrar and a tallier, and it is divided into four phases, setup,
preparation, commitment, and tallying. The setup phase proceeds as follows.
(1) The registrar creates a signing key pair skR and pk(skR), and publishes the public part pk(skR). In
addition, each voter is assumed to have a signing key pair skV and pk(skV), where the public part
pk(skV) has been published.
24 B. Blanchet & B. Smyth / Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers
The preparation phase then proceeds as follows.
(2) The voter chooses coins k and k′, computes the commitment to her vote M = commit(k, v) and
the signed blinded commitment sign(skV , blind(k′,M)), and sends the signature, paired with her
public key, to the registrar.
(3) The registrar checks that the signature belongs to an eligible voter and returns the blinded com-
mitment signed by the registrar sign(skR, blind(k′,M)).
(4) The voter verifies the registrar’s signature and unblinds the message to recover Mˆ = sign(skR,M),
that is, her commitment signed by the registrar.
After a deadline, the protocol enters the commitment phase.
(5) The voter posts her ballot Mˆ to the bulletin board.
Similarly, the tallying phase begins after a deadline.
(6) The tallier checks validity of all signatures on the bulletin board and prepends an identifier ` to
each valid entry.
(7) The voter checks the bulletin board for her entry, the pair `, Mˆ, and appends the commitment factor
k.
(8) Finally, using k, the tallier opens all of the ballots and announces the election outcome.
The distinction between phases is essential to uphold the protocol’s security properties. In particular,
voters must synchronise before the commitment phase to ensure ballot secrecy (observe that without
synchronisation, traffic analysis may allow the voter’s signature to be linked with the commitment to
her vote – this is trivially possible when a voter completes the commitment phase before any other voter
starts the preparation phase, for instance – which can then be linked to her vote) and before the tallying
phase to avoid publishing partial results, that is, to ensure fairness (see Cortier & Smyth [53] for further
discussion on fairness).
4.1.3. Model
To analyse ballot secrecy, it suffices to model the participants that must be honest (i.e., must follow
the protocol description) for ballot secrecy to be satisfied. All the remaining participants are controlled
by the adversary. The FOO protocol assures ballot secrecy in the presence of dishonest authorities if the
voter is honest. Hence, it suffices to model the voter’s part of FOO as a process.
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Definition 8. The process Pfoo(xsk, xvote) modelling a voter in FOO, with signing key xsk and vote xvote,
is defined as follows
Pfoo(xsk, xvote) = ν k.ν k′. % Step 2
let M = commit(k, xvote) in
let M′ = blind(k′,M) in
c〈(pk(xsk), sign(xsk,M′))〉.
c(y). % Step 4
let y′ = checksign(pk(skR), y) in
if y′ = M′ then
let Mˆ = unblind(k′, y) in
1:: c〈Mˆ〉. % Step 5
2:: c(z). % Step 7
let z2 = pi2,2(z) in
if z2 = Mˆ then
c〈(z, k)〉
The process Pfoo(sk1, v1) | · · · | Pfoo(skn, vn) models an election with n voters casting votes v1, . . . , vn
and encodes the separation of phases using barriers.
4.1.4. Analysis: ballot secrecy
Based upon [2, 54] and as outlined in Section 1, we formalise ballot secrecy for two voters A and B
with the assertion that an adversary cannot distinguish between a situation in which voter A votes for
candidate v and voter B votes for candidate v′, from another one in which A votes v′ and B votes v. We
use the biprocess Pfoo(skA, diff[v, v′]) to model A and the biprocess Pfoo(skB, diff[v′, v]) to model B, and
formally express ballot secrecy as an equivalence which can be checked using Theorem 13. Voters’ keys
are modelled as free names, since ballot secrecy can be achieved without confidentiality of these keys.
(Voters’ keys must be secret for other properties.)
Definition 9 (Ballot secrecy). FOO preserves ballot secrecy if the biprocess Qfoo = Pfoo(skA, diff[v, v′]) |
Pfoo(skB, diff[v′, v]) satisfies observational equivalence.
To provide further insight into how our compiler works, let us consider how to informally prove this
equivalence: that fst(Qfoo) is indistinguishable from snd(Qfoo). Before the first barrier, A outputs
(pk(skA), sign(skA, blind(k′a, commit(ka, v))))
in fst(Qfoo) and
(pk(skA), sign(skA, blind(k′a, commit(ka, v
′))))
in snd(Qfoo), where the name k′a remains secret. By the equational theory for blinding, N can only be
recovered from blind(M,N) if M is known, so these two messages are indistinguishable. The situation
is similar for B. Therefore, before the first barrier, A moves in fst(Qfoo) are mimicked by A moves in
snd(Qfoo) and B moves in fst(Qfoo) are mimicked by B moves in snd(Qfoo).
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Let us define sc(k, v) = sign(skR, commit(k, v)). After the first barrier, A outputs
sc(ka, v) and ((`1, sc(ka, v)), ka) in fst(Qfoo)
sc(ka, v′) and ((`1, sc(ka, v′)), ka) in snd(Qfoo)
where `1 is chosen by the adversary. It follows that A reveals her vote v in fst(Qfoo) and her vote v′ in
snd(Qfoo), so these messages are distinguishable. However, B outputs
sc(kb, v′) and ((`2, sc(kb, v′)) kb) in fst(Qfoo)
sc(kb, v) and ((`2, sc(kb, v)) kb) in snd(Qfoo)
where `2 is similarly chosen by the adversary. Hence, B’s messages in snd(Qfoo) are indistinguishable
from A’s messages in fst(Qfoo). Therefore, after the first barrier, A moves in fst(Qfoo) are mimicked by B
moves in snd(Qfoo) and symmetrically, B moves in fst(Qfoo) are mimicked by A moves in snd(Qfoo), that
is, the roles are swapped at the first barrier. Our compiler encodes the swapping, hence we can show that
FOO satisfies ballot secrecy using Theorem 13. Moreover, ProVerif proves this result automatically. This
proof is done for two honest voters, but it generalises immediately to any number of possibly dishonest
voters, since other voters can be part of the adversary.
Showing that FOO satisfies ballot secrecy is not new: Delaune, Kremer & Ryan [2, 54] present a
manual proof of ballot secrecy, Chothia et al. [55] provide an automated analysis in the presence of a
passive adversary, and Delaune, Ryan & Smyth [40], Klus, Smyth & Ryan [43], and Chadha, Ciobâca˘ &
Kremer [19, 20] provide automated analysis in the presence of an active adversary. More recently, Dreier
et al. [50] provided a mechanised analysis in the tool Tamarin in the presence of an active adversary.
Nevertheless, our analysis is useful to demonstrate our approach.
FOO does not satisfy receipt-freeness, because each voter knows the coins used to construct their
ballot and these coins can be used as a witness to demonstrate how they voted. In an effort to achieve
receipt-freeness, the protocol by Lee et al. [56] uses a hardware device to introduce coins into the ballot
that the voter does not know.
4.2. Case study: Lee et al.
4.2.1. Protocol description
The protocol uses a registrar and some talliers, and it is divided into three phases, setup, voting, and
tallying. For simplicity, we assume there is a single tallier. The setup phase proceeds as follows.
(1) The tallier generates a key pair and publishes the public key.
(2) Each voter is assumed to have a signing key pair and an offline tamper-resistant hardware device.
The registrar is assumed to know the public keys of voters and devices. The registrar publishes
those public keys.
The voting phase proceeds as follows.
(3) The voter encrypts her vote and inputs the resulting ciphertext into her tamper-resistant hardware
device.
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(4) The hardware device re-encrypts the voter’s ciphertext, signs the re-encryption, computes a Des-
ignated Verifier Proof that the re-encryption was performed correctly, and outputs these values to
the voter.
(5) If the signature and proof are valid, then the voter outputs the re-encryption and signature, along
with her signature of these elements.
The hardware device re-encrypts the voter’s encrypted choice to ensure that the voter’s coins cannot be
used as a witness demonstrating how the voter voted. Moreover, the device is offline, thus communica-
tion between the voter and the device is assumed to be untappable, hence, the only meaningful relation
between the ciphertexts input and output by the hardware device is due to the Designated Verifier Proof,
which can only be verified by the voter.
Finally, the tallying phase proceeds as follows.
(6) Valid ballots (that is, ciphertexts associated with valid signatures) are input to a mixnet and the
mixnet’s output is published. (We model the mixnet as a collection of parallel processes that each
input a ballot, verify the signatures, synchronise with the other processes, and finally output the
ciphertext on an anonymous channel.)
(7) The tallier decrypts each ciphertext and announces the election outcome.
4.2.2. Analysis: ballot secrecy
In this protocol, the authorities and hardware devices must be honest for ballot secrecy to be satisfied,
so we need to explicitly model them. Therefore, building upon (1), we formalise ballot secrecy by the
equivalence
C[V(A, v) | V(B, v′)] ≈ C[V(A, v′) | V(B, v)] (2)
where the process V(A, v) models a voter with identity A (including its private key, its device public
key, and its private channel to the device) voting v, and the context C models all other participants:
authorities and hardware devices. (Other voters are included in C for privacy results concerning more
than two voters.) With two voters, we prove ballot secrecy by swapping data at the synchronisation in
the mixnet. With an unbounded number of honest voters, we prove ballot secrecy using Corollary 16 to
model an unbounded number of voters by a replicated process. As far as we know, this is the first proof
of this result. In order to prove this result, we separate the processes (voter, device, mixnet and tallier)
corresponding to voters A and B, from those corresponding to the other voters, as outlined at the end
of Section 3.5.1. We keep the synchronisations in the mixnet for A and B and swap data there, and we
remove synchronisations in the processes for other voters in order to apply Corollary 16.
With the addition of a dishonest voter, the proof of ballot secrecy fails. This failure does not come
from a limitation of our approach, but from a ballot copying attack, already mentioned in the original
paper [56, Section 6] and formalised in [57]: the dishonest voter can copy A’s vote, as follows. The
adversary observes A’s encrypted vote on the bulletin board (since it is accompanied by the voter’s
signature), inputs the ciphertext to the adversary’s tamper-resistant hardware device, uses the output to
derive a related ballot, and derives A’s vote from the election outcome, which contains two copies of A’s
vote.
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4.2.3. Analysis: receipt-freeness
Following [2], receipt-freeness can be formalised as follows: there exists a process V ′ such that
V ′\chc ≈ V(A, v) (3)
C[V(A, v′)chc | V(B, v)] ≈ C[V ′ | V(B, v′)] (4)
where the context C[_] appears in (2), chc is a public channel, V ′\chc = ν chc.(V | !chc(x)), which is
intuitively equivalent to removing all outputs on channel chc from V ′, and V(A, v′)chc is obtained by
modifying V(A, v′) as follows: we output on channel chc the private key of A, its device public key, all
restricted names created by V , and messages received by V . Intuitively, the voter A tries to prove to the
adversary how she voted, by giving the adversary all its secrets, as modelled by V(A, v′)chc. The process
V ′ simulates a voter A that votes v, as shown by (3), but outputs messages on channel chc that aim to
make the adversary think that it voted v′. The equivalence (4) shows that the adversary cannot distinguish
voter A voting v′ and trying to prove it to the adversary and voter B voting v, from V ′ and voter B voting
v′, so V ′ successfully votes v and deceives the adversary in thinking that it voted v′.
In the case of the Lee et al. protocol, V ′ is derived from V(A, v)chc by outputting on chc a fake Des-
ignated Verifier Proof that simulates a proof of re-encryption of a vote for v′, instead of the Designated
Verifier Proof that it receives from the device. Intuitively, the adversary cannot distinguish a fake proof
from a real one, because only the voter can verify the proof.
The equivalence (3) holds by construction of V ′, because after removing outputs on chc, V ′ is exactly
the same as V(A, v). We prove (4) using our approach, for an unbounded number of honest voters. Hence,
this protocol satisfies receipt-freeness for an unbounded number of honest voters. As far as we know, this
is the first proof of this result. Obviously, receipt-freeness does not hold with dishonest voters, because
it implies ballot secrecy.
4.2.4. Variant by Dreier, Lafourcade & Lakhnech
Dreier, Lafourcade & Lakhnech [57] introduced a variant of this protocol in which, in step 3, the voter
additionally signs the ciphertext containing her vote, and in step 4, the hardware device verifies this
signature. We have also analysed this variant using our approach. It is sufficiently similar to the original
protocol that we obtain the same results for both.
4.2.5. Variant by Delaune, Kremer, & Ryan
Protocol description. Delaune, Kremer, & Ryan [2] introduced a variant of this protocol in which the
hardware devices are replaced with a single administrator, and the voting phase becomes:
(3) The voter encrypts her vote, signs the ciphertext, and sends the ciphertext and signature to the
administrator on a private channel.
(4) The administrator verifies the signature, re-encrypts the voter’s ciphertext, signs the re-encryption,
computes a Designated Verifier Proof of re-encryption, and outputs these values to the voter.
(5) If the signature and proof are valid, then the voter outputs her ballot, consisting of the signed
re-encryption (via an anonymous channel).
The mixnet is replaced with the anonymous channel, and the tallying phase becomes:
(6) The collector checks that the ballots are pairwise distinct, checks the administrator’s signature on
each of the ballots, and, if valid, decrypts the ballots and announces the election outcome.
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Analysis: ballot secrecy. We have shown that this variant preserves ballot secrecy, with two honest
voters, using our approach. In this proof, all keys are public and the collector is not trusted, so it is in-
cluded in the adversary. Since the keys are public, any number of dishonest voters can also be included
in the adversary, so the proof with two honest voters suffices to imply ballot secrecy for any number of
possibly dishonest voters. Hence, this variant avoids the ballot copying attack and satisfies a stronger
ballot secrecy property than the original protocol. Thus, we automate the proof made manually in [2].
For this variant, the swapping occurs at the beginning of the voting process, so we can actually prove the
equivalence by proving diff-equivalence after applying the general property thatC[P | Q] ≈ C[Q | P], as
explained in Section 3.5.3. Furthermore, an extension of ProVerif [52, Section 5] takes advantage of this
property to merge processes into biprocesses in order to prove observational equivalence. The approach
outlined in that paper also succeeds in proving ballot secrecy for this variant. It takes 12 minutes 46 sec-
onds, while our implementation with swapping takes 31 seconds. It spends most of the time computing
the merged biprocesses; this is the reason why it is slower.
Analysis: receipt-freeness. We prove receipt-freeness for two honest voters. The administrator and
voter keys do need to be secret, and all authorities need to be explicitly modelled. The process V ′ is built
similarly to the one for the original protocol by Lee et al. Equivalence (3) again holds by construction
of V ′. To prove (4), much like in [2], we model the collector as parallel processes that each input one
ballot, check the signature, decrypt, synchronise together, and output the decrypted vote:
c(b); let ev = checksign(pkA, b) in let v = dec(skC , ev) in 2:: c〈v〉
There are as many such processes as there are voters, two in our case. However, such a collector does
not check that the ballots are pairwise distinct: each of the two parallel processes has access to a single
ballot, so each process individually cannot check that the two ballots are distinct. Therefore, this check is
difficult to implement in the original process fed to our compiler in a way that would allow our approach
to conclude. Instead, we implemented this necessary check by manually modifying the code generated
by our compiler, by adding a check that the ballots are distinct in the process that swaps data. An excerpt
of the obtained code follows:
(c(b); let ev = checksign(pkA, b) in
let v = dec(skC , ev) in a1〈(b, v)〉; c1(v′); c〈v′〉)
|
(c(b); let ev = checksign(pkA, b) in
let v = dec(skC , ev) in a2〈(b, v)〉; c2(v′); c〈v′〉)
|
(a1((b1, v1)); a2((b2, v2));
(∗) if b1 = b2 then 0 else
c1〈diff[v1, v2]〉; c2〈diff[v2, v1]〉)
This code shows the two collectors and the process that swaps data. We use a((b, v)) as an abbreviation
for a(x); let b = pi1,2(x) in let v = pi2,2(x) in. The ballots are sent on channels a1 and a2 in addition to the
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decrypted votes, and we check that the two ballots are distinct at line (∗). With this code, ProVerif proves
the diff-equivalence, so we have shown receipt-freeness for two honest voters. This proof is difficult to
generalise to more voters in ProVerif, because in this case the collector should swap two ballots among
the ones it has received (the two ballots coming from the voters that swap their votes), but it has no
means to detect which ones.
4.3. Other examples
The idea of swapping for proving equivalences has been applied by Dahl, Delaune & Steel [3] to prove
privacy in a vehicular ad-hoc network [58]. They manually encode swapping based upon the informal
idea of [40]. We have repeated their analysis using our approach. Thus, we automate the encoding of
swapping in [3], and obtain stronger confidence in the results thanks to our soundness proof.
Backes, Hrit¸cu & Maffei [31] also manually encode the idea of swapping, together with other en-
coding tricks, to prove a privacy notion stronger than receipt-freeness, namely coercion resistance, of
the protocol by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson [59]. We removed their manual encoding of swapping and
repeated their analysis using our approach. In this case, swapping is done immediately under a paral-
lel composition, so it is particularly easy to encode manually, as explained in Section 3.5.3. (Both our
analysis and the one by Backes, Hrit¸cu & Maffei abstract away the malleability of encryption, because
ProVerif does not support it.)
Although the swapping idea also applies to the election scheme Helios [60], we cannot automati-
cally verify it with ProVerif, because ProVerif does not support the equational theory of homomorphic
encryption.
5. Conclusion
We extend the applied pi calculus to include barrier synchronisation and define a compiler to the
calculus without barriers. Our compiler enables swapping data between processes at barriers, which
simplifies proofs of observational equivalence. We have proven the soundness of our compiler and have
implemented it in ProVerif, thereby extending the class of equivalences that can be automatically ver-
ified. The applicability of the results is demonstrated by analysing ballot secrecy, receipt-freeness, and
coercion resistance in election schemes, as well as privacy in a vehicular ad-hoc network. The idea of
swapping data at barriers was introduced in [40], without proving its soundness, and similar ideas have
been used by several researchers [3, 31], so we believe that it is important to provide a strong theoretical
foundation to this technique.
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Appendix. Proofs for Section 3
This appendix proves the results announced in Section 3. Appendix A proves Lemma 2 (validity);
Appendix B proves Lemma 4 (soundness of split); and Appendix C proves Proposition 5 (soundness of
annotate). Appendices D to G are devoted to the proof of results needed for Theorem 13. We show that
barrier elimination commutes with renaming and substitution (proof of Lemma 8 in Appendix D) and
that it preserves reduction (proof of Lemma 9 in Appendix E). Using these interim results, we prove
Proposition 7 (Appendix F). Appendix G proves Propositions 10 and 11. Finally, Appendix H proves
our results on replicated barriers (Section 3.5.1).
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2 (validity)
Lemma 17. If C[Q] is valid, σ is a ground substitution, C[_] binds the variables in dom(σ) and no
other variable above the hole, and fn(range(σ)) ∩ channels(barriers(Q)) = ∅, then barriers(Qσ) =
barriers(Q) and Qσ is valid.
Proof. The process Qσ is closed because fv(Qσ) ⊆ fv(Q) \ dom(σ) ∪ fv(range(σ)) ⊆ fv(C[Q]) ∪
fv(range(σ)) = ∅ since C[Q] is closed and σ is ground.
Consider an annotated barrier in Q, such that Q = C′[t[a, c, ς]::Q′]. We rename the bound variables
so that the variables in dom(σ) are not bound by C′[_] and the bound names so that the names in the
range of σ are not bound by C′[_]. Since C[Q] is valid, we have fv(Q′) ⊆ dom(ς), so (t[a, c, ς]::Q′)σ =
t[a, c, ςσ]::Q′, so
barriers((t[a, c, ς]::Q′)σ) = barriers(t[a, c, ςσ]::Q′)
= {t[a, c, ordom(ςσ)]::Q′} ∪ barriers(Q′)
= {t[a, c, ordom(ς)]::Q′} ∪ barriers(Q′)
= barriers(t[a, c, ς]::Q′)
Therefore, barriers(Qσ) = barriers(Q).
Hence, channels(barriers(Qσ)) = channels(barriers(Q)) ⊆ channels(barriers(C[Q])) has pairwise
distinct elements, and
channels(barriers(Qσ)) ∩ fn-nobc(Qσ)
⊆ channels(barriers(Q)) ∩ (fn-nobc(Q) ∪ fn(range(σ)))
⊆ channels(barriers(C[Q])) ∩ fn-nobc(Q) = ∅ .
Consider an annotated barrier in Qσ, such that Qσ = C′[t[a, c, ς]::Q′]. Then Q = C′′[t[a, c, ς′]::Q′′],
C′[_] = C′′[_]σ, ς = ς′σ, and Q′ = Q′′σ, after renaming the bound variables so that the variables
in dom(σ) are not bound by C′′[_] nor by ς′ and the bound names so that the names in the range of
σ are not bound by C′′[_]. Since C[Q] is valid, fv(Q′′) ⊆ dom(ς′), so Q′ = Q′′σ = Q′′. We have
fv(Q′) = fv(Q′′) ⊆ dom(ς′) = dom(ς), C′[_] does not bind a, c, and the names in fn(Q′) = fn(Q′′) since
C[C′′[_]] does not bind a, c, and the names in fn(Q′′) and C′[_] binds the same names as C′′[_]. 
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Proof of Lemma 2. We prove each of the properties (denoted in italics) below:
If P is a valid process, then Cinit(P) is valid. Suppose that P is valid. As defined in Section 3.1,
we have Cinit(P) = B, E,P , where B = barriers(P), E = channels(B), and P = {P}, so a fortiori
barriers(P) ⊆ B, channels(B) ⊆ E, all processes in P are valid, the elements of channels(B) =
channels(barriers(P)) are pairwise distinct, and channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = channels(barriers(P)) ∩
fn-nobc(P) = ∅. Therefore, Cinit(P) is valid.
Validity is preserved by reduction. We proceed by cases on the reduction rule.
• Cases (RED NIL) and (RED PAR) are easy.
• Case (RED REPL): Since barriers never occur under replication, the transformed process !P con-
tains no barrier. Preservation of validity follows easily.
• Case (RED RES): Suppose that B, E,P ∪{ν n.P} → B, E ∪{n′},P ∪{P{n′/n}} by (RED RES),
for some name n′ such that n′ 6∈ E∪ fn(P∪{ν n.P}), and B, E,P∪{ν n.P} is a valid configuration.
Suppose that an annotated barrier t[a, c, ς]::Q occurs in P, so that P = C[t[a, c, ς]::Q]. Since ν n.P
is valid, ν n.C[_] does not bind the names a, c, and fn(Q) above the hole, hence n /∈ {a, c}∪ fn(Q),
so
(t[a, c, ς]::Q){n′/n} = t[a, c, ς{n′/n}]::Q ,
so
barriers((t[a, c, ς]::Q){n′/n}) = barriers(t[a, c, ς{n′/n}]::Q)
= {t[a, c, ordom(ς{n′/n})]::Q} ∪ barriers(Q)
= {t[a, c, ordom(ς)]::Q} ∪ barriers(Q)
= barriers(t[a, c, ς]::Q)
Therefore, barriers(P{n′/n}) = barriers(P) = barriers(ν n.P). Hence, we have barriers(P ∪
{P{n′/n}}) = barriers(P ∪ {ν n.P}) ⊆ B and channels(B) ⊆ E ⊆ E ∪ {n′}.
The processes in P are valid. Let us show that the process P{n′/n} is valid. The process
P{n′/n} is closed because ν n.P is closed. The elements of channels(barriers(P{n′/n})) =
channels(barriers(ν n.P)) are pairwise distinct. We have
channels(barriers(P{n′/n})) ∩ fn-nobc(P{n′/n})
⊆ channels(barriers(ν n.P)) ∩ (fn-nobc(ν n.P) ∪ {n′}) = ∅
because n′ /∈ channels(barriers(ν n.P)) since
channels(barriers(ν n.P)) ⊆ channels(B) ⊆ E
and n′ /∈ E. Consider an annotated barrier in P{n′/n}, such that P{n′/n} = C[t[a, c, ς]::Q]. Since
n′ /∈ fn(ν n.P) = fn(P) \ {n}, ν n.P = ν n.(P{n′/n}{n/n′}) = ν n.(C[t[a, c, ς]::Q]{n/n′}). We
rename the bound names inC[_] so that they are different from n and n′, and letC′[_] = C[_]{n/n′}.
Then ν n.P = ν n.C′[t[a{n/n′}, c{n/n′}, ς{n/n′}]::Q{n/n′}]. Since ν n.P is valid, we have fv(Q) =
fv(Q{n/n′}) ⊆ dom(ς{n/n′}) = dom(ς) andC[_] does not bind a, c, and the names in fn(Q) above
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the hole since ν n.C′[_] does not bind a{n/n′}, c{n/n′}, and the names of fn(Q{n/n′}) above the
hole.
The elements of channels(B) are pairwise distinct by hypothesis, and
channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P ∪ {P{n′/n}})
⊆ channels(B) ∩ (fn-nobc(P ∪ {ν n.P}) ∪ {n′}) = ∅
because n′ /∈ channels(B) since channels(B) ⊆ E and n′ /∈ E.
• Case (RED I/O): Suppose that B, E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N(x).Q} → B, E,P ∪ {P,Q{M/x}} by
(RED I/O) and B, E,P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N(x).Q} is a valid configuration.
The term M is ground since N〈M〉.P is closed. Moreover, channels(barriers(Q)) ∩ fn(M) = ∅
since channels(barriers(P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N(x).Q})) ∩ fn-nobc(P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N(x).Q}) = ∅.
Hence, by Lemma 17, we have barriers(P∪{P,Q{M/x}}) = barriers(P∪{P,Q}) = barriers(P∪
{N〈M〉.P,N(x).Q}) ⊆ B. We have channels(B) ⊆ E. The processes in P are valid. The validity
of P follows easily from the validity of N〈M〉.P. The process Q{M/x} is valid by Lemma 17.
The elements of channels(B) are pairwise distinct by hypothesis, and channels(B)∩ fn-nobc(P ∪
{P,Q{M/x}}) ⊆ channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P ∪ {N〈M〉.P,N(x).Q}) = ∅. Therefore, B, E,P ∪
{P,Q{M/x}} is valid.
• Case (RED DESTR 1): Suppose that B, E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} → B, E,P ∪ {P{M/x}}
by (RED DESTR 1), where D ⇓ M, and B, E,P ∪{let x = D in P else Q} is a valid configuration.
The term M is ground since D is ground, and channels(barriers(P)) ∩ fn(M) = ∅ since
channels(barriers(P)) ∩ fn(D) = ∅, since channels(barriers(let x = D in P else Q)) ∩ fn-nobc(
let x = D in P else Q) = ∅ by validity of let x = D in P else Q.
Hence, by Lemma 17, we have
barriers(P ∪ {P{M/x}}) = barriers(P ∪ {P})
⊆ barriers(P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q})
⊆ B .
We have channels(B) ⊆ E. The processes in P are valid. The process P{M/x} is valid by
Lemma 17. The elements of channels(B) are pairwise distinct by hypothesis, and channels(B) ∩
fn-nobc(P ∪ {P{M/x}}) ⊆ channels(B)∩ fn-nobc(P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q}) = ∅. Therefore,
B, E,P ∪ {P{M/x}} is valid.
• Case (RED DESTR 2): Suppose that B, E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} → B, E,P ∪ {Q} by
(RED DESTR 2) and B, E,P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q} is a valid configuration.
We have barriers(P ∪ {Q}) ⊆ barriers(P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q}) ⊆ B and channels(B) ⊆
E. The processes in P are valid. The validity of Q follows easily from the validity of let x =
D in P else Q. The elements of channels(B) are pairwise distinct, and channels(B)∩ fn-nobc(P ∪
{Q}) ⊆ channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P ∪ {let x = D in P else Q}) = ∅. Therefore, B, E,P ∪ {Q} is
valid.
• Case (RED BAR’): Let P1 = P ∪ {t:: P1, . . . , t:: Pm, t[am+1, cm+1, ςm+1]:: Pm+1, . . . , t[an, cn,
ςn]::Pn} P2 = P ∪ {P1, . . . , Pm, Pm+1ςm+1, . . . , Pnςn}, and suppose that B, E,P1 → B′, E,P2 by
(RED BAR’), where B = {tm, t[am+1, cm+1, ordom(ςm+1)]:: Pm+1, . . . , t[an, cn, ordom(ςn)]:: Pn} ∪
B′; for all t′ such that t′ 6 t, we have t′ /∈ B′ and t′[_]:: _ /∈ B′; and B, E,P1 is a valid configuration.
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The substitution ςi is ground since t[ai, ci, ςi]:: Pi is closed and channels(barriers(Pi)) ∩
fn(range(ςi)) = ∅ since channels(barriers(t[ai, ci, ςi]:: Pi)) ∩ fn-nobc(t[ai, ci, ςi]:: Pi) = ∅ since
t[ai, ci, ςi]:: Pi is valid.
We have
barriers(P2)
= barriers(P ∪ {P1, . . . , Pm, Pm+1ςm+1, . . . , Pnςn})
= barriers(P ∪ {P1, . . . , Pn}) by Lemma 17
= barriers(P1) \ {tm, t[am+1, cm+1, ordom(ςm+1)]:: Pm+1, . . . , t[an, cn, ordom(ςn)]:: Pn}
⊆ B \ {tm, t[am+1, cm+1, ordom(ςm+1)]:: Pm+1, . . . , t[an, cn, ordom(ςn)]:: Pn}
= B′
and channels(B′) ⊆ channels(B) ⊆ E. The processes in P are valid. The validity of Pi for i 6 m
follows easily from the validity of t:: Pi. The process Piςi for i > m is valid by Lemma 17. The
elements of channels(B′) ⊆ channels(B) are pairwise distinct, and channels(B′)∩ fn-nobc(P2) ⊆
channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P1) = ∅.
Validity is preserved by application of an adversarial context. Let C = B, E,P be a valid configuration
and C[_] be an adversarial context. We have C[_] = ν n˜.(_ | Q) with fv(Q) = ∅ and barriers(Q) = ∅.
We suppose that the names in E have been renamed so that fn(Q) ∩ E = ∅. Then we have C[C] =
B, E ∪ {n˜},P ∪ {Q}. Let us show that C[C] is valid. We have
barriers(P ∪ {Q}) = barriers(P) ⊆ B
channels(B) ⊆ E ⊆ E ∪ {n˜}
All processes in P are valid and Q is valid since it is closed and contains no barriers. The elements of
channels(B) are pairwise distinct by hypothesis, and channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P ∪ {Q}) = ∅ because
channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅ and channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(Q) ⊆ E ∩ fn(Q) = ∅. Therefore, C[C] is
valid.
Validity is preserved by application of fst and snd. We consider the case of fst. The case of snd is
symmetric.
We first show that, if biprocess P is valid, then fst(P) is valid. Suppose that P is valid. Since P is closed
and fv(fst(P)) ⊆ fv(P), the process fst(P) is also closed. The elements of channels(barriers(fst(P))) =
channels(barriers(P)) are pairwise distinct. We have channels(barriers(fst(P))) ∩ fn-nobc(fst(P)) ⊆
channels(barriers(P)) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅. Consider an annotated barrier in fst(P), such that fst(P) =
C[t[a, c, ς]::Q]. Then P = C′[t[a, c, ς′]::Q′] such that C[_] = fst(C′[_]), ς = fst(ς′), and Q = fst(Q′).
We have fv(Q) ⊆ fv(Q′) ⊆ dom(ς′) = dom(ς), C′[_] does not bind a, c, nor the names in fn(Q′) above
the hole, so C[_] does not bind a, c, nor the names in fn(Q) ⊆ fn(Q′) above the hole, because C[_] binds
the same names as C′[_]. So fst(P) is valid.
Next, we show that, if a configuration B, E,P is valid, then fst(B, E,P) = fst(B), E, fst(P) is valid.
Suppose that B, E,P is valid. We have
barriers(fst(P)) = fst(barriers(P)) ⊆ fst(B) ,
B. Blanchet & B. Smyth / Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers 35
channels(fst(B)) = channels(B) ⊆ E ,
all processes in fst(P) are valid since all processes in P are valid, the elements of channels(fst(B)) =
channels(B) are pairwise distinct, and
channels(fst(B)) ∩ fn-nobc(fst(P)) ⊆ channels(B) ∩ fn-nobc(P) = ∅ .
So fst(B, E,P) is valid. 
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 4 (soundness of split)
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof proceeds by induction on Q.
• Case Q = M with (fv(M)∪ fn(M))∩U = ∅. We have split(U,M) = (x, (M/x)) where x is a fresh
variable, so Q′ = x and ς = (M/x). Hence Q′ς = M = Q, (fv(range(ς)) ∪ fn(range(ς))) ∩ U =
(fv(M) ∪ fn(M)) ∩ U = ∅, fv(Q′) = dom(ς) = {x}, fn(Q′) = ∅, and dom(ς) consists of fresh
variables.
• Case Q = u with u ∈ U. We have split(U, u) = (u, ∅), so Q′ = u and ς = ∅. Hence Q′ς = u = Q,
fv(range(ς)) ∪ fn(range(ς)) = ∅, dom(ς) = ∅, fv(Q′) ⊆ U, and fn(Q′) ⊆ U.
• Case Q = C[Q1, . . . ,Qn]. The considered contexts C[_] do not have any free names or variables.
We have split(U,C[Q1, . . . ,Qn]) = (C[Q′1, . . . ,Q′n], ς) where for all i 6 n, split(U ∪ Ui,Qi) =
(Q′i, ςi), C[_, . . . , _] binds the names and variables in Ui above the i-th hole, and ς = ς1+ · · ·+ςn,
so Q′ = C[Q′1, . . . ,Q′n]. Hence Q′ς = C[Q′1ς1, . . . ,Q′nςn] because Q′iς = Q′iςi, since fv(Q′i) ⊆
dom(ςi)∪U and, for all j 6= i, dom(ς j) consists of fresh variables, so it does not intersect dom(ςi)∪
U, and C[_, . . . , _] does not capture names nor variables because (fv(range(ςi))∪ fn(range(ςi)))∩
Ui = ∅ and dom(ςi)∩Ui = ∅. Moreover, (fv(range(ς))∪fn(range(ς)))∩U ⊆
⋃
i6n(fv(range(ςi))∪
fn(range(ςi))) ∩ (U ∪ Ui) = ∅. For all i 6 n, dom(ςi) ⊆ fv(Q′i) ⊆ dom(ςi) ∪ U ∪ Ui, so
dom(ςi) ⊆ fv(Q′i) \Ui ⊆ dom(ςi)∪U since dom(ςi)∩Ui = ∅, so by taking the union over i 6 n,
dom(ς) ⊆ fv(Q′) ⊆ dom(ς)∪U. For all i 6 n, fn(Q′i) ⊆ U ∪Ui, so fn(Q′i) \Ui ⊆ U, so by taking
the union over i 6 n, fn(Q′) ⊆ U. Finally, for all i 6 n, dom(ςi) consists of fresh variables, so
dom(ς) consists of fresh variables. 
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 5 (soundness of annotate)
Proposition 18. Let B, E,P be a valid configuration, and n be a name, where n /∈ fn(P). We have
B, E,P ≈ B, E ∪ {n},P .
Proof. If n ∈ E, the result is obvious. Let us prove it when n /∈ E ∪ fn(P). When B, E,P is valid,
B, E ∪ {n},P is a fortiori valid. We define the relationR by
(B, E,P) R (B, E ∪ {n},P)
for any B, E, P , n such that n /∈ E ∪ fn(P), and B, E,P and B, E ∪ {n},P are valid configurations. We
have that R ∪ R−1 is symmetric and satisfies the three conditions of Definition 1. For condition 2, we
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assume C = (B, E,P) R C′ = (B, E∪{n},P) and C → C1. In case C → C1 is derived by (RED RES), we
have P = P ′∪{ν n0.P} and C = (B, E,P ′∪{ν n0.P}) reduces into C1 = (B, E∪{n1},P ∪{P{n1/n0}})
with n1 /∈ E∪ fn(P). Moreover, C′ = (B, E∪{n},P ′∪{ν n0.P}) reduces into C′1 = (B, E∪{n′1, n},P ∪
{P{n′1/n0}}) with n′1 /∈ E ∪{n}∪ fn(P). By the convention that configurations (B, E,P) are considered
equal modulo any renaming of the names in E,P that leaves fn(P) \ E unchanged, we have C′1 =
(B, E ∪ {n1, n′},P ∪ {P{n1/n0}}) for some n′ /∈ E ∪ {n1} ∪ fn(P), so C1 R C′1. The other cases are left
to the reader. HenceR ∪ R−1 ⊆ ≈. This property implies the desired equivalence. 
Proposition 19. For any contextC[_] without replication above the hole, any process P, barrier t, names
a, c, ordered substitution ς such that C[t:: Pς] and C[t[a, c, ς]:: P] are valid processes, we have
C[t:: Pς] ≈ C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]
Proof. We define the relationsR0 andR1 by
(B, E,P) R0 (B′, E,P)
(B, E, {C[t:: Pς]} ∪ P) R1 (B′, E, {C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]} ∪ P)
where (B, E,P), (B′, E,P), (B, E, {C[t:: Pς]} ∪ P), and (B′, E, {C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]} ∪ P) are valid con-
figurations and for all t′, B|t′ = B′|t′ , where B|t′ denotes the total number of barriers of the form t
′
or t′[a′, c′, x˜]:: P′ in B. We show that R = R0 ∪ R1 ∪ R−11 is symmetric and satisfies the three con-
ditions of Definition 1. Conditions 1 and 3 are obvious. To prove Condition 2, we notice that, when
(B, E,P) R (B′, E,P ′), (RED BAR’) is enabled for barrier t′ in (B, E,P) if and only if it is enabled
in (B′, E,P ′). Indeed, (RED BAR’) is enabled for barrier t′ in (B, E,P) when B|t′′ = 0 for all t′′ < t′
and P contains B|t′ processes of form t′:: P or t′[a, c, ς]:: P. (Validity ensures that barriers(P) ⊆ B, so
for barrier t′, B and P contain the same number of standard, resp. annotated, barriers and the content of
annotated barriers also matches.) From this property, we prove Condition 2:
• Case 1: (B, E,P) R0 (B′, E,P) and (B, E,P) −→ C1.
If this reduction is by (RED BAR’) for barrier t′, then C1 = (B1, E,P1) where B1 is obtained from
B by removing all (standard or annotated) barriers t′. Let B′1 be obtained from B′ by removing all
(standard or annotated) barriers t′. Then we have (B′, E,P) −→ (B′1, E,P1) and (B1, E,P1) R0
(B′1, E,P1).
Otherwise, C1 = (B, E1,P1), (B′, E,P) −→ (B′, E1,P1) by the same reduction and (B, E1,P1) R0
(B′, E1,P1).
• Case 2: (B, E, {C[t:: Pς]}∪P) R1 (B′, E, {C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]}∪P) and (B, E, {C[t:: Pς]}∪P) −→ C1.
If this reduction reduces only processes in P , then the same reduction applies on the other side,
much like in Case 1, and the reduced processes are inR1.
If this reduction reduces C[t:: Pς] and is not (RED BAR’) for barrier t, then the same reduction
also applies on the other side. If the reduction eliminates t:: Pς (so the reduction reduces C[t:: Pς]
by (RED DESTR 1) or (RED DESTR 2)), then the reduced processes are in R0. Otherwise, the
reduced processes are still in R1, and any substitutions are applied to ς. (By validity, fv(P) ⊆
dom(ς), so substitutions leave P unchanged.)
If this reduction is (RED BAR’) for barrier t, then context C[_] is empty. (When n barriers t re-
duce, P0 = {C[t:: Pς]} ∪ P contains n barriers t at the top-level and B contains n barriers t. Since
B. Blanchet & B. Smyth / Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers 37
barriers(P0) ⊆ B by validity, all barriers t in P0 are at the top-level and are reduced.) The reduc-
tion transforms t:: Pς into Pς. The same reduction also applies on the other side, and transforms
t[a, c, ς]:: P into Pς, so the reduced processes are inR0.
• Case 3: (B′, E, {C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]} ∪ P) R−11 (B, E, {C[t:: Pς]} ∪ P) and (B, E, {C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]} ∪
P) −→ C1. This case can be treated similarly to Case 2.
HenceR0 ∪ R1 ∪ R−11 ⊆ ≈.
Let
B = barriers(C[t:: Pς]) ,
B′ = barriers(C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]) ,
E = channels(B) , and
E′ = channels(B′) = E ∪ {a, c} .
We have
Cinit(C[t:: Pς]) = B, E, {C[t:: Pς]} and
Cinit(C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]) = B′, E′, {C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]} .
By Lemma 2, these configurations are valid. Furthermore, since B, E, {C[t:: Pς]} is valid, B, E′,
{C[t:: Pς]} is a fortiori valid, and since C[t[a, c, ς]:: P] is valid,
channels(barriers(C[t[a, c, ς]:: P])) ∩ fn-nobc(C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]) = ∅ ,
so {a, c} ∩ fn-nobc(C[t:: Pς]) = ∅ and the elements of multiset channels(barriers(C[t[a, c, ς]:: P])) are
pairwise distinct, so {a, c} ∩ channels(barriers(C[t:: Pς])) = ∅, so {a, c} ∩ fn(C[t:: Pς]) = ∅. By Propo-
sition 18,
B, E, {C[t:: Pς]} ≈ B, E′, {C[t:: Pς]} .
By the result shown above,
B, E′, {C[t:: Pς]} ≈ B′, E′, {C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]} ,
so by transitivity of ≈,
Cinit(C[t:: Pς]) ≈ Cinit(C[t[a, c, ς]:: P]) ,
which proves the desired result. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. Let us first show that P′0 = annotate(P0) is valid. The proof is done by induc-
tion on the number of transformation steps made from P0. First, the process after 0 transformation steps,
P0 itself, is valid. Indeed, since P0 is a closed standard biprocess, it contains no annotated barrier, hence
it is valid. Moreover, if the process after n transformation steps is valid, then so is the process after n+1
transformation steps, because the transformation performed by annotate preserves validity: if C[t::Q] is
valid, then C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′] is also valid, as we show next. We can then conclude that P′0 = annotate(P0)
is valid as well.
Let us show that, if C[t::Q] is valid, then C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′] is also valid. We have fv(t[a, c, ς]::Q′) =
fv(range(ς)) ∪ (fv(Q′) \ dom(ς)) = fv(Q′ς) = fv(Q) since fv(Q′) = dom(ς) by Lemma 3. Therefore, if
C[t::Q] is closed, then C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′] is also closed.
Since barriers are transformed in a top-down order, the barriers in Q and Q′ are standard, so we have
channels(barriers(C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′])) = {a, c} ∪ channels(barriers(C[t::Q])) .
Since a and c are distinct fresh names, the elements of channels(barriers(C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′])) are pairwise
distinct, and
channels(barriers(C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′])) ∩ fn-nobc(C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′])
⊆ ({a, c} ∪ channels(barriers(C[t::Q]))) ∩ fn-nobc(C[t::Q]) = ∅ .
• For the transformed barrier, a and c are fresh names, so C[_] does not bind a nor c above the hole.
Moreover, by Lemma 3, fv(Q′) ⊆ dom(ς) and C[_] does not bind the names in fn(Q′) above the
hole, since fn(Q′) = ∅.
• For the annotated barriers that already occur in C[t::Q], we have C[t::Q] = C′[t′[a′, c′, ς′]::Q′′].
Since barriers are transformed in a top-down order, the barriers in Q are standard, so the annotated
barriers in question occur in C[_], and two cases may happen:
∗ The transformed barrier is under t′[a′, c′, ς′], inside Q′′:
C[t::Q] = C′[t′[a′, c′, ς′]::C′′[t::Q]]
C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′] = C′[t′[a′, c′, ς′]::C′′[t[a, c, ς]::Q′]]
for some context C′′[_]. Since C′[t′[a′, c′, ς′]::C′′[t::Q]] is valid, we have fv(C′′[t::Q]) ⊆
dom(ς′) andC′[_] does not bind a′, c′, nor the names in fn(C′′[t::Q]) above the hole. Further-
more, fv(t[a, c, ς]::Q′) = fv(Q) = fv(t::Q), so fv(C′′[t[a, c, ς]::Q′]) ⊆ dom(ς′). Moreover,
fn(t[a, c, ς]::Q′) = {a, c} ∪ fn(Q′ς)
= {a, c} ∪ fn(Q)
= {a, c} ∪ fn(t::Q) ,
so fn(C′′[t[a, c, ς]::Q′]) = {a, c} ∪ fn(C′′[t::Q]). Since a and c are fresh, they are not bound
by C′[_], so C′[_] does not bind the names in fn(C′′[t[a, c, ς]::Q′]) above the hole.
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∗ The transformed barrier and the barrier t′[a′, c′, ς′] are not under one another:
C[t::Q] = C′′[t′[a′, c′, ς′]::Q′′, t::Q]
C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′] = C′′[t′[a′, c′, ς′]::Q′′, t[a, c, ς]::Q′]
for some context C′′[_, _] with two holes. Since C′′[t′[a′, c′, ς′]::Q′′, t::Q] is valid, we have
fv(Q′′) ⊆ dom(ς′) and C′′[_, _] does not bind a′, c′, nor the names in fn(Q′′) above its first
hole.
In all cases, C[t[a, c, ς]::Q′] is valid.
From an annotated biprocess P′0 = annotate(P0), we can rebuild P0 by replacing each occurrence
of an annotated barrier t[a, c, ς]::Q with t::Qς, by Lemma 3. Therefore, we can also rebuild fst(P0)
from fst(P′0) by replacing each occurrence of an annotated barrier t[a, c, ς]::Q (in fst(P′0)) with t::Qς.
Furthermore, since validity is preserved by application of fst (Lemma 2), the considered processes are
valid. Hence by applying several times Proposition 19 and by transitivity of ≈, we obtain that fst(P′0) ≈
fst(P0). We obtain snd(P′0) ≈ snd(P0) symmetrically. 
Appendix D. Proof of Lemma 8 (barrier elimination commutes with renaming and substitution)
Proof of Lemma 8. Let us proceed by structural induction on P. In the base case, we derive
bar-elim(0)σ = 0σ = 0 = bar-elim(0) = bar-elim(0σ) by definition of bar-elim and application of
σ. The inductive cases (Figure 7) additionally apply the induction hypothesis. In Figure 7, we assume
name n′ is fresh in the name restriction case; variable x′ is fresh in the input and expression evaluation
cases; variables z, z′1, . . . , z′n are fresh in the barrier case. We rename bound names and variables to fresh
names and variables respectively, to avoid any name or variable capture. 
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 9 (barrier elimination preserves reduction)
Proof of Lemma 9. Suppose configurations C, C′, C1 and C′1 are given above. We proceed by case anal-
ysis of our reduction rules. First, we consider Property 1.
(RED NIL) In this case, P = P1 ∪ {0} and E = E1. It follows that bar-elim(P) = bar-elim(P1) ∪ {0},
hence, C′ −→ C′1.
(RED REPL) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P0 and a process R such that
P = P0∪{!R} andP1 = P0∪{R, !R}. It follows that bar-elim(P) = bar-elim(P0)∪{bar-elim(!R)}
and bar-elim(P1) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {bar-elim(R), bar-elim(!R)}. Moreover, since bar-elim(!R) =
!bar-elim(R), we have C′ −→ C′1.
(RED PAR) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P0 and processes R and R′ such
that P = P0 ∪ {R | R′} and P1 = P0 ∪ {R,R′}. It follows that bar-elim(P) = bar-elim(P0) ∪
{bar-elim(R) | bar-elim(R′)} and bar-elim(P1) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {bar-elim(R), bar-elim(R′)},
hence, C′ −→ C′1.
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Fig. 7. Derivations for the inductive case of Lemma 8
bar-elim(Q | R)σ = (bar-elim(Q) | bar-elim(R))σ
= bar-elim(Q)σ | bar-elim(R)σ
= bar-elim(Qσ) | bar-elim(Rσ)
= bar-elim(Qσ | Rσ)
= bar-elim((Q | R)σ)
bar-elim(!Q)σ = (!bar-elim(Q))σ
= !(bar-elim(Q)σ)
= !bar-elim(Qσ)
= bar-elim(!(Qσ))
= bar-elim((!Q)σ)
bar-elim(ν n.Q)σ = (ν n.bar-elim(Q))σ
= ν n′.(bar-elim(Q){n′/n}σ)
= ν n′.(bar-elim(Q{n′/n})σ)
= ν n′.bar-elim(Q{n′/n}σ)
= bar-elim(ν n′.(Q{n′/n}σ))
= bar-elim((ν n.Q)σ)
bar-elim(M(x).Q)σ = (M(x).bar-elim(Q))σ
= Mσ(x′).(bar-elim(Q){x′/x}σ)
= Mσ(x′).bar-elim(Q{x′/x}σ)
= bar-elim(Mσ(x′).(Q{x′/x}σ))
= bar-elim((M(x).Q)σ)
bar-elim(M〈N〉.Q)σ = (M〈N〉.bar-elim(Q))σ
= M〈N〉σ.bar-elim(Q)σ
= M〈N〉σ.bar-elim(Qσ)
= bar-elim(M〈N〉σ.Qσ)
= bar-elim((M〈N〉.Q)σ)
bar-elim(let x = D in Q else R)σ = (let x = D in bar-elim(Q) else bar-elim(R))σ
= let x′ = Dσ in bar-elim(Q){x′/x}σ else bar-elim(R)σ
= let x′ = Dσ in bar-elim(Q{x′/x}σ) else bar-elim(Rσ)
= bar-elim(let x′ = Dσ in Q{x′/x}σ else Rσ)
= bar-elim((let x = D in Q else R)σ)
bar-elim(t[a, c, (M1/z1, . . . , Mn/zn)]::Q)σ
= (a〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉.c(z).let z1 = pi1,n(z) in . . . let zn = pin,n(z) in bar-elim(Q))σ
= a〈(M1σ, . . . ,Mnσ)〉.c(z).let z′1 = pi1,n(z) in . . . let z′n = pin,n(z) in
bar-elim(Q){z′1/z1, . . . , z′n/zn}σ
= a〈(M1σ, . . . ,Mnσ)〉.c(z).let z′1 = pi1,n(z) in . . . let z′n = pin,n(z) in
bar-elim(Q{z′1/z1, . . . , z′n/zn}σ)
= bar-elim(t[a, c, (M1σ/z′1, . . . , Mnσ/z′n)]::Q{z
′
1/z1, . . . , z
′
n/zn}σ)
= bar-elim((t[a, c, (M1/z1, . . . , Mn/zn)]::Q)σ)
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(RED RES) In this case, there exist a multiset of processes P0, a process R and names n and n′ such
that P = P0 ∪ {ν n.R}, E1 = E ∪ {n′} and P1 = P0 ∪ {R{n′/n}}, where n′ 6∈ E ∪ fn(P). It
follows that bar-elim(P) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {ν n.bar-elim(R)} and bar-elim(P1) = bar-elim(P0) ∪
{bar-elim(R{n′/n})}. We have bar-elim(R{n′/n}) = bar-elim(R){n′/n} by Lemma 8, hence, C′ →
C′1.
(RED I/O) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P0, processes R and R′, terms M
and N, and a variable x such that P = P0 ∪ {N〈M〉.R,N(x).R′} and P1 = P0 ∪ {R,R′{M/x}}.
It follows that bar-elim(P) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {N〈M〉.bar-elim(R),N(x).bar-elim(R′)} and
bar-elim(P1) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {bar-elim(R), bar-elim(R′{M/x})}. Moreover, we have bar-elim(
R′{M/x}) = bar-elim(R′){M/x} by Lemma 8, hence, C′ → C′1.
(RED DESTR 1) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P0, processes R and R′,
an expression D, a term M, and a variable x such that P = P0 ∪ {let x = D in R else R′} and
P1 = P0 ∪ {R{M/x}}, where D ⇓ M. It follows that bar-elim(P) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {let x =
D in bar-elim(R) else bar-elim(R′)} and bar-elim(P1) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {bar-elim(R{M/x})}.
Moreover, we have bar-elim(R{M/x}) = bar-elim(R){M/x} by Lemma 8, hence, C′ → C′1.
(RED DESTR 2) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P0, processes R and R′, an
expression D, and a variable x such that P = P0 ∪ {let x = D in R else R′} and P1 = P0 ∪ {R′},
where there is no M such that D ⇓ M. It follows that bar-elim(P) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {let x =
D in bar-elim(R) else bar-elim(R′)} and bar-elim(P1) = bar-elim(P0) ∪ {bar-elim(R′)}, hence,
C′ −→ C′1.
(RED BAR’) By inspection of our reduction rules, the reduction C −→ C1 cannot apply (RED BAR’),
since B remains constant in the configurations C and C1.
Secondly, we consider Property 2.
(RED NIL) In this case, E = E1, 0 ∈ bar-elim(P), andP ′1 = bar-elim(P)\{0}. By definition of bar-elim
(Figure 6), it follows immediately that 0 ∈ P and hence C −→ C1, where C1 = B, E1,Q ∪ P1 and
P1 = P\{0}. Moreover, since bar-elim(0) = 0, we have P ′1 = bar-elim(P1).
(RED REPL) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P ′0 and a process R such that
bar-elim(P) = P ′0∪{!R} and P ′1 = P ′0∪{R, !R}. So there are P0 and R0 such that P = P0∪{R0}
with P ′0 = bar-elim(P0) and !R = bar-elim(R0). By definition of bar-elim (Figure 6), there exists
a process Rˆ such that bar-elim(Rˆ) = R and R0 =!Rˆ, so P = P0 ∪ {!Rˆ}. Let P1 = P0 ∪ {Rˆ, !Rˆ}. It
follows immediately that C −→ C1, where C1 = B, E1,Q∪ P1 and P ′1 = bar-elim(P1).
(RED PAR) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P ′0 and processes R and R′
such that bar-elim(P) = P ′0 ∪ {R | R′} and P ′1 = P ′0 ∪ {R,R′}. So there are P0 and R0 such
that P = P0 ∪ {R0} with P ′0 = bar-elim(P0) and R | R′ = bar-elim(R0). By definition of
bar-elim (Figure 6), there exist processes Rˆ and Rˆ′ such that bar-elim(Rˆ) = R, bar-elim(Rˆ′) = R′,
and R0 = Rˆ | Rˆ′, so P = P0 ∪ {Rˆ | Rˆ′}. Let P1 = P0 ∪ {Rˆ, Rˆ′}. It follows immediately that
P ′1 = bar-elim(P1) and C −→ C1, where C1 = B, E1,Q∪ P1.
(RED RES) In this case, there exist a multiset of processes P ′0, a process R and names n and n′ such
that E1 = E ∪ {n′}, bar-elim(P) = P ′0 ∪ {ν n.R}, and P ′1 = P ′0 ∪ {R{n′/n}}, where n′ 6∈
E ∪ fn(P ′0 ∪ {ν n.R}). So there are P0 and R0 such that P = P0 ∪ {R0} with P ′0 = bar-elim(P0)
and ν n.R = bar-elim(R0). By definition of bar-elim (Figure 6), there exists a process Rˆ such
that R = bar-elim(Rˆ) and R0 = ν n.Rˆ, so P = P0 ∪ {ν n.Rˆ}. Let P1 = P0 ∪ {Rˆ{n′/n}}. It
follows that C −→ C1 and bar-elim(P1) = bar-elim(P0)∪{bar-elim(Rˆ{n′/n})}. Moreover, we have
P ′1 = bar-elim(P1) by Lemma 8.
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(RED I/O) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P ′0, processes R and R′,
terms M and N, and a variable x such that bar-elim(P) = P ′0 ∪ {N〈M〉.R,N(x).R′} and
P ′1 = P ′0 ∪ {R,R′{M/x}}. So there are P0, R0, and R′0 such that P = P0 ∪ {R0,R′0} with
P ′0 = bar-elim(P0), N〈M〉.R = bar-elim(R0), and N(x).R′ = bar-elim(R′0). By definition of
bar-elim (Figure 6), N(x).R′ = bar-elim(R′0) implies N(x).Rˆ′ = R′0 for some process Rˆ′ such
that bar-elim(Rˆ′) = R′. Moreover, N〈M〉.R = bar-elim(R0) implies: 1) there exists a pro-
cess Rˆ such that R0 = N〈M〉.Rˆ, where bar-elim(Rˆ) = R; or 2) N is a name and there ex-
ist a barrier t, name c, ordered substitution ς, process R′′, variable z, and integer n, such that
R0 = t[N, c, ς]::R′′, and R = c(z).let z1 = pi1,n(z) in · · · let zn = pin,n(z) in bar-elim(R′′). In
the first case, P = P0 ∪ {N〈M〉.Rˆ,N(x).Rˆ′}. Let P1 = P0 ∪ {Rˆ, Rˆ′{M/x}}. It follows that
C −→ C1, where C1 = B, E1,Q∪P1. Moreover, we have bar-elim(Rˆ′{M/x}) = bar-elim(Rˆ′){M/x}
by Lemma 8, hence, P ′1 = bar-elim(P1). We show that the second case cannot arise. Since N
is a name, we have N ∈ fn-nobc(N(x).Rˆ′) = fn-nobc(R′0) ⊆ fn-nobc(Q ∪ P). Furthermore,
N ∈ channels(barriers(t[N, c, ς]::R′′)) = channels(barriers(R0)) ⊆ channels(barriers(Q ∪ P))
and since C is a valid configuration, we have channels(barriers(Q ∪ P)) ∩ fn-nobc(Q ∪ P) = ∅,
thereby deriving a contradiction.
(RED DESTR 1) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P ′0, processes R and R′, an
expression D, a term M, and a variable x such that bar-elim(P) = P ′0 ∪ {let x = D in R else R′}
and P ′1 = P ′0 ∪ {R{M/x}}, where D ⇓ M. So there are P0 and R0 such that P = P0 ∪ {R0}
with P ′0 = bar-elim(P0) and let x = D in R else R′ = bar-elim(R0). By definition of bar-elim
(Figure 6), there exist processes Rˆ and Rˆ′ such that bar-elim(Rˆ) = R, bar-elim(Rˆ′) = R′, and R0 =
let x = D in Rˆ else Rˆ′, so P = P0∪{let x = D in Rˆ else Rˆ′}. Let P1 = P0∪{Rˆ{M/x}}. It follows
that C −→ C1, where C1 = B, E1,Q ∪ P1. Moreover, we have bar-elim(P1) = bar-elim(P0) ∪
{bar-elim(Rˆ{M/x})}. Furthermore, we have bar-elim(Rˆ{M/x}) = bar-elim(Rˆ){M/x} by Lemma 8,
hence, P ′1 = bar-elim(P1).
(RED DESTR 2) In this case, E = E1 and there exist a multiset of processes P ′0, processes R and R′,
an expression D, and a variable x such that bar-elim(P) = P ′0 ∪ {let x = D in R else R′} and
P ′1 = P ′0 ∪ {R′}, where there is no M such that D ⇓ M. So there are P0 and R0 such that
P = P0 ∪ {R0} with P ′0 = bar-elim(P0) and let x = D in R else R′ = bar-elim(R0). By definition
of bar-elim (Figure 6), there exist processes Rˆ and Rˆ′ such that bar-elim(Rˆ) = R, bar-elim(Rˆ′) = R′,
and R0 = let x = D in Rˆ else Rˆ′, so P = P0 ∪ {let x = D in Rˆ else Rˆ′}. Let P1 = P0 ∪ {Rˆ′}. It
follows immediately that P ′1 = bar-elim(P1) and C −→ C1, where C1 = B, E1,Q∪ P1.
(RED BAR’) By definition of bar-elim, configuration C′ does not contain barriers and therefore we do
not consider applications of the rule (RED BAR’). 
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 7 (main proposition)
We introduce some rudimentary results (Lemmata 20 – 22), before proving the main technical result
(Proposition 7). An annotated configuration is a configuration in which all processes are annotated.
Lemma 20. Suppose C = B, E,P is a valid annotated configuration such that bar-elim(P) = N〈M〉.Q
for some processes P ∈ P and Q, and terms M and N, where fn(N) ∩ E = ∅. We have C ↓N .
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Proof. By definition of bar-elim, either: 1) P = N〈M〉.R ∈ P for some process R such that
bar-elim(R) = Q; or 2) P = t[N, c, ς]::R ∈ P for some barrier t, channel name c, ordered substitu-
tion ς, and process R. In the first case, it follows immediately that C ↓N . We show that the second case
cannot arise. By definition of a valid configuration (Definition 4), channels(barriers(P)) ⊆ E, so N ∈ E,
which contradicts the assumption fn(N) ∩ E = ∅. 
We define
add-lets(Q) =
{
let z j = pi j,n((M1, . . . ,Mn)) in · · · let zn = pin,n((M1, . . . ,Mn)) in Q′∣∣∣ 1 6 j 6 n,Q = Q′{M j/z j, . . . , Mn/zn},M1, . . . ,Mn ground terms,z j, . . . , zn pairwise distinct variables } ∪ {Q}
Lemma 21. Let Q′ ∈ add-lets(Q) and B, E,P ∪ {Q′} be a valid configuration. We have B, E,P ∪
{Q′} −→∗ B, E,P ∪ {Q}. Furthermore, if Q′ 6= Q and B, E,P ∪ {Q′} −→ B, E,P ∪ {Q′′} by reducing
Q′, then Q′′ ∈ add-lets(Q).
Proof. If Q′ = Q, then we have obviously B, E,P ∪ {Q′} −→∗ B, E,P ∪ {Q}, with no reduction.
Otherwise,
Q′ = let z j = pi j,n((M1, . . . ,Mn)) in · · · let zn = pin,n((M1, . . . ,Mn)) in Q1
where Q = Q1{M j/z j, . . . , Mn/zn}, M1, . . . ,Mn are ground terms, z j, . . . , zn are pairwise distinct vari-
ables, and 1 6 j 6 n. Then B, E,P∪{Q′} −→∗ B, E,P∪{Q} by n− j+1 applications of (RED DESTR 1).
If B, E,P ∪{Q′} −→ B, E,P ∪{Q′′} by reducing Q′, then this reduction is obtained by one application
of (RED DESTR 1), so
Q′′ = let z j+1 = pi j+1,n((M1, . . . ,Mn)) in · · · let zn = pin,n((M1, . . . ,Mn)) in Q2
where Q2 = Q1{M j/z j}, so
Q = Q1{M j/z j, . . . , Mn/zn}
= Q2{M j+1/z j+1, . . . , Mn/zn} .
If j < n, we obtain Q′′ ∈ add-lets(Q) with j + 1 instead of j. If j = n, we obtain Q′′ = Q, so we also
have Q′′ ∈ add-lets(Q). 
Lemma 22. If B, E,P ∪ {t[a, c, ς]::Q} is a valid annotated configuration, then c /∈ fn(P ∪ {Qς}).
Proof. By validity, the elements of multiset channels(B) are pairwise distinct. Since channels(B) con-
tains
channels(barriers(P ∪ {t[a, c, ς]::Q})) = {a, c} ∪ channels(barriers(P ∪ {Q}))
= {a, c} ∪ channels(barriers(P ∪ {Qς})) ,
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we have c /∈ channels(barriers(P∪{Qς})). Moreover channels(B)∩fn-nobc(P∪{t[a, c, ς]::Q}) = ∅ so
c /∈ fn-nobc(P ∪{t[a, c, ς]::Q}) ⊇ fn-nobc(P ∪{Q})∪ fn(range(ς)) ⊇ fn-nobc(P ∪{Qς}). Therefore,
c /∈ fn(P ∪ {Qς}). 
These results allow us to prove Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose the configurations C0 and C′0 are given in Proposition 7. We will con-
struct a symmetric relation R such that fst(C0) R fst(C′0), snd(C0) R snd(C′0), and R satisfies the three
conditions of Definition 1.
RelationR. We first define some functions
bar-elimin(c〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉,Q) ={
c(z).let z1 = pi1,n(z) in · · · let zn = pin,n(z) in bar-elim(Q′)∣∣ Q = Q′{M1/z1, . . . , Mn/zn}, z, z1, . . . , zn pairwise distinct variables}
bar-elim′in(t[a, c, ς]::Q) ={
c(z).let z1 = pi1,n(z) in · · · let zn = pin,n(z) in bar-elim(Q)∣∣ ς = (M1/z1 . . . , Mn/zn), z variable different from z1, . . . , zn}
swapper1(∅) = {0}
swapper1(B) ={
a1(x1) . · · · . an(xn).c1〈x f (1)〉 . · · · . cn〈x f (n)〉.R∣∣ B = {t[a1, c1, z˜1]::Q1, . . . , t[an, cn, z˜n]::Qn} ∪ B′,
where t′ > t for all t′[a, c, z˜]::Q ∈ B′;
function f is a permutation of {1, . . . , n} such
that Ql/z˜l =ch Q f (l)/z˜ f (l) for all 1 6 l 6 n;
R ∈ swapper1(B′); and x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct variables
}
if B 6= ∅
The sets of processes bar-elimin(c〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉,Q) and bar-elim′in(t[a, c, ς]::Q) represent partially re-
duced compiled barriers: the output on channel a has been executed but not the input on channel c. For
bar-elim′in(t[a, c, ς]::Q), this set is computed from the process t[a, c, ς]::Q before reduction of the bar-
rier. For bar-elimin(c〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉,Q), this set is computed from the process Q after reduction of the
barrier. In this case, we need the additional argument c〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉 representing the message sent on
channel c to know how to compile the barrier. The function swapper1(B) is similar to swapper(B) but
produces only one component of the diff.
Let us consider the smallest relationsR1,R2 andR3 between configurations such that the conditions
below are satisfied.
(1) Suppose that B, E,P ∪ Q is a valid annotated configuration, P = {P1, . . . , Pm}, Q =
{t[a1, c1, ς1]::Q1, . . . , t[ak, ck, ςk]::Qk}, ςl = (Ml,1/zl,1, . . . , Ml,|ςl|/zl,|ςl|) for all l 6 k, B =
{t[a1, c1, z˜1]::Q1, . . . , t[an, cn, z˜n]::Qn} ∪ B′, t′ > t for all t′[a′, c′, z˜′]::Q′ ∈ B′, k 6 n, and
z˜l = (zl,1, . . . , zl,|˜zl|) for all l 6 n. Finally, suppose f is a permutation of {1, . . . , n} such that,
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for all 1 6 l 6 n, we have Ql/z˜l =ch Q f (l)/z˜ f (l). Let P ′ = {P′1, . . . , P′m} and Q′ = {Q′1, . . . ,Q′k},
where P′i ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Pi)) for all i 6 m and Q′i ∈ bar-elim′in(t[ai, ci, ςi]::Qi) for all i 6 k.
We have(
B, E,P ∪Q
)
R1
(
∅, E,P ′ ∪Q′ ∪ {R}
)
where
R ∈
{
ak+1(xk+1) . · · · . an(xn) . c1〈N f (1)〉 . · · · . cn〈N f (n)〉 . R′∣∣∣Nl = (Ml,1, . . . ,Ml,|ςl|) for all l 6 k; Nl = xl for all l > k;R′ ∈ swapper1(B′); and variables xk+1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct
}
Remark. Configuration C = B, E,P ∪ Q is waiting to synchronise at barrier t and configuration
C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪Q′ ∪ {R} represents an encoding of such a synchronisation with swapping. Multi-
set Q contains k processes that are ready to synchronise at barrier t, while n processes are needed
for the synchronisation to take place. The multiset P may contain other processes that will syn-
chronise at barrier t. In the configuration C′, the communications that implement the barrier t are
partly done: the k processes in Q′, corresponding to the k processes in Q, have output messages
on private channels and are awaiting input on private channels, i.e., the processes are ready to
synchronise at t. Process R has received k private channel inputs and is awaiting for a further n− k
private inputs; once all inputs have been received, process R will respond to all processes waiting
to synchronise.
(2) Suppose B, E,P ∪ Q is a valid annotated configuration, such that P = {P1, . . . , Pm} and Q =
{Q1, . . . ,Qk}. Let P ′ = {P′1, . . . , P′m} andQ′ = {Q′1, . . . ,Q′k}, where P′i ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Pi))
for all i 6 m, and Q′i ∈ bar-elimin(ci〈Mi〉,Qi) for all i 6 k, for some pairwise distinct names
c1, . . . , ck in E \ fn(P ∪Q), and some ground tuples M1, . . . ,Mk. We have(
B, E,P ∪Q
)
R2
(
∅, E,P ′ ∪Q′ ∪ {R}
)
where R ∈ {c1〈M1〉 . · · · . ck〈Mk〉 . R′ | R′ ∈ swapper1(B)}.
Remark. Configuration C = B, E,P ∪Q has just synchronised and configuration C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪
Q′ ∪ {R} represents an encoding of such a synchronisation with swapping. When k > 0, the
communications that implement the last barrier upon which synchronisation happened are not
fully done yet: k outputs remain in R, and correspondinglyQ′ contains k processes ready to receive
these outputs. The condition Q′i ∈ bar-elimin(ci〈Mi〉,Qi) constrains Mi to be a tuple of terms that
occur in Qi, so that Q′i reduces to bar-elim(Qi) after receiving Mi on channel ci.
(3) Suppose P = {P1, . . . , Pm} is a multiset of processes such that barriers(P) = ∅, and E is a set of
names. Let P ′ = {P′1, . . . , P′m} be a multiset of processes, where P′i ∈ add-lets(Pi) for all i 6 m.
We have:(
∅, E,P
)
R3
(
∅, E,P ′
)
LetR = R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3 ∪ R−11 ∪ R−12 ∪ R−13 .
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Relation R relates fst(C0) with fst(C′0) and snd(C0) with snd(C′0). Recall that C0 = B0, E, {P0} and
C′0 = ∅, E, {bar-elim(P0),R0}, where B0 = barriers(P0), E = channels(B0), and R0 ∈ swapper(B0). By
Lemma 2, C0 = Cinit(P0) is valid, so fst(C0) and snd(C0) are valid. We notice that, if R0 ∈ swapper(B0),
then fst(R0) ∈ swapper1(fst(B0)), using the identity function for f , and snd(R0) ∈ swapper1(snd(B0)),
using the same function f as in the computation of R0 ∈ swapper(B0). Hence we have fst(C0) R2 fst(C′0)
with B = fst(B0), k = 0, P = {fst(P0)}, P ′ = bar-elim(P), Q′ = Q = ∅, R = fst(R0), and snd(C0) R2
snd(C′0) similarly using snd instead of fst.
RelationR satisfies the conditions of Definition 1. The relationR is symmetric and it remains to show
thatR satisfies the three conditions of Definition 1. Let us first introduce the following results about our
relation.
Fact 1. Given configurations C = B, E,P ∪ Q and C′ such that C R2 C′, we have C′ −→∗
∅, E, bar-elim(P ∪Q) ∪ {R′}, where R′ ∈ swapper1(B).
Proof of Fact 1. We use the notations of the definition of R2. We transform C′ by applying (RED I/O)
k times between R and Q′i for i from 1 to k. Then R reduces into R′ ∈ swapper1(B) and Q′i reduces into
an element of add-lets(bar-elim(Qi)). By Lemma 21, we reduce P′i into bar-elim(Pi) and further reduce
Q′i into bar-elim(Qi), so Fact 1 holds.
Fact 2. Given configurations C, C′, and C1 such that C R1 C′ with k = n and C −→ C1 by (RED BAR’),
we have C1 R2 C′.
Fact 2 handles the swapping of data at barriers, so it is a key step of the proof.
Proof of Fact 2. We use the notations of the definition of R1. Since Q contains n barriers, we have
C −→ C1 = B′, E,P ∪ {Q1ς1, . . . ,Qnςn} by (RED BAR’). We have C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R} and since
k = n, we have R = c1〈N f (1)〉 . · · · . cn〈N f (n)〉 . R′ with Nl = (Ml,1, . . . ,Ml,|ςl|) for all l 6 n and
R′ ∈ swapper1(B′). Moreover, Q′ = {Q′1, . . . ,Q′n} with Q′i ∈ bar-elim′in(t[ai, ci, ςi]::Qi) for all i 6 n.
Since for all 1 6 l 6 n, Ql/z˜l =ch Q f (l)/z˜ f (l), we have
Ql{y1/zl,1, . . . , y|˜zl|/zl,|˜zl|} =ch Q f (l){y1/z f (l),1, . . . , y|˜zl|/z f (l),|˜zl|} ,
where y1, . . . , y|˜zl| are fresh variables, so we have
Ql{y1/zl,1, . . . , y|˜zl|/zl,|˜zl|} = Q f (l){y1/z f (l),1, . . . , y|˜zl|/z f (l),|˜zl|}ρl ,
for some renaming ρl of channels of annotated barriers. (Recall that processes are considered equal mod-
ulo renaming of bound names and variables.) The renaming ρl maps names in channels(barriers(Q f (l)))
to names in channels(barriers(Ql)). Since the names in channels(barriers(P ∪ Q)) are pairwise dis-
tinct, for l 6= l′, channels(barriers(Ql)) ∩ channels(barriers(Ql′)) = ∅, so we can merge all functions
ρl for 1 6 l 6 n into a single function ρ. Since furthermore f is a permutation, ρ is a permutation
of channels(B′) and leaves other names unchanged. Since the names in channels(barriers(P ∪ Q)) are
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pairwise distinct, ρ leaves unchanged the names in channels(barriers(P)) and a1, c1, . . . , an, cn. Hence,
we obtain
bar-elim(Qi){y1/zi,1, . . . , y|˜zi|/zi,|˜zi|} = bar-elim(Q f (i)){y1/z f (i),1, . . . , y|˜zl|/z f (i),|˜zl|}ρ
for all i 6 n by Lemma 8, so
bar-elim′in(t[ai, ci, ςi]::Qi) = bar-elim
′
in(t[ai, ci, ς f (i)]::Q f (i))ρ
for all i 6 n. (Recall that processes are considered equal modulo renaming of bound variables.) So
Q′i ∈ bar-elim′in(t[ai, ci, ς f (i)]::Q f (i))ρ. Therefore, Q′i ∈ bar-elimin(ci〈N f (i)〉,Q f (i)ς f (i))ρ, so Q′iρ−1 ∈
bar-elimin(ci〈N f (i)〉,Q f (i)ς f (i)). We define Q1 = {Q1ς1, . . . ,Qnςn} = {Q f (1)ς f (1), . . . ,Q f (n)ς f (n)} since
f is a permutation of {1, . . . , n}, Q′1 = {Q′1ρ−1, . . . ,Q′nρ−1} = Q′ρ−1, and R1 = Rρ−1 = c1〈N f (1)〉 .
· · · . cn〈N f (n)〉 . R′1, where R′1 = R′ρ−1 ∈ swapper1(B′ρ−1) since R′ ∈ swapper1(B′). Moreover,
B′ρ−1 = B′ since ρ−1 maps a barrier of Ql to a barrier of Q f (l) for all l 6 n and leaves other barriers
unchanged. Therefore, R′1 ∈ swapper1(B′). Moreover, since C is valid, the elements of channels(B) are
pairwise distinct so c1, . . . , cn are pairwise distinct names. By Lemma 22, for all i 6 n, ci /∈ fn({Qiςi} ∪
P ∪ Q \ {t[ai, ci, ςi]::Qi}) ⊇ fn(P ∪ Q1). Furthermore, c1, . . . , cn are in channels(B), so they are in E
since C is valid, hence they are in E\fn(P∪Q1). We have C′ = (∅, E,P ′∪Q′∪{R}) = (∅, Eρ−1,P ′ρ−1∪
Q′ρ−1 ∪{Rρ−1}) since configurations are considered equal modulo renaming, so C′ = (∅, E,P ′ ∪Q′1 ∪
{R1}). It follows that C1 = (B′, E,P ∪ Q1) R2 C′ = (∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′1 ∪ {R1}) using N f (i) for Mi for all
i 6 n.
We proceed with the proof of Proposition 7 by showing that R satisfies the three conditions of Defini-
tion 1.
Condition 1. We show that, if C R′ C′ and C ↓N , then C′ −→∗↓N , where R′∈ {R1,R2,R3,R−11 ,R−12
,R−13 }, by distinguishing the following cases:
R′ = R1. In this case, C = B, E,P ∪Q and C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪Q′ ∪{R}. By inspection of P ∪Q, we have
Pi = N〈M〉.Q ∈ P for some index i, process Q, and term M, with fn(N) ∩ E = ∅. It follows that
bar-elim(Pi) = N〈M〉.bar-elim(Q) and by Lemma 21, P′i ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Pi)) reduces into
bar-elim(Pi) inside C′, hence C′ −→∗↓N .
R′ = R2. In this case, C = B, E,P ∪ Q, where N〈M〉.Q ∈ P ∪ Q for some process Q and term M,
with fn(N) ∩ E = ∅. It follows that N〈M〉.bar-elim(Q) ∈ bar-elim(P ∪ Q). By Fact 1, we have
C′ −→∗ C′1 = ∅, E, bar-elim(P ∪Q)∪ {R′}, where R′ ∈ swapper1(B) and, moreover, C′1 ↓N , hence,
C′ −→∗↓N .
R′ = R3. In this case, C = ∅, E,P and C′ = ∅, E,P ′, where Pi = N〈M〉.Q ∈ P for some index i,
process Q and term M, with fn(N) ∩ E = ∅. We have P′i ∈ add-lets(Pi), so by Lemma 21, P′i
reduces into Pi inside C′. It follows immediately that C′ −→∗↓N .
R′ = R−11 . In this case, C = ∅, E,P ′∪Q′∪{R} and C′ = B, E,P∪Q. We have N〈M〉.Q ∈ P ′∪Q′∪{R}
for some process Q and term M, with fn(N)∩E = ∅. The process R cannot be the output N〈M〉.Q
because if k 6= n, then R starts with an input and if k = n, then R starts with an output on
channel c1 ∈ E since channels(B) ⊆ E. Therefore, by inspection of P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}, we have
P′i = N〈M〉.Q = bar-elim(Pi) ∈ P ′ for some index i, and C′ ↓N by Lemma 20.
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R′ = R−12 . In this case C = ∅, E,P ′∪Q′∪{R} and C′ = B, E,P∪Q. We have N〈M〉.Q ∈ P ′∪Q′∪{R}
for some process Q and term M, with fn(N) ∩ E = ∅. If k > 0, then R starts with an output on
c1 ∈ E \ fn(P ∪Q). It follows immediately that N 6= c1, since fn(N) ∩ E = ∅. If k = 0, then R is
either 0 or starts with an input, so in all cases, R does not start with the output N〈M〉.Q. Therefore,
by inspection of P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}, we have P′i = N〈M〉.Q = bar-elim(Pi) ∈ P ′ for some index i,
and C′ ↓N by Lemma 20.
R′ = R−13 . In this case, C = ∅, E,P ′ and C′ = ∅, E,P . By inspection of P ′, it follows that P′i =
N〈M〉.Q = Pi ∈ P for some index i, process Q, and term M, with fn(N) ∩ E = ∅, and, hence,
C′ ↓N .
Condition 2. We show that, if C R′ C′ and C −→ C1, then C′ −→∗ C′1 and C1 R C′1 for some C′1, where
R′∈ {R1,R2,R3,R−11 ,R−12 ,R−13 }, by distinguishing the following cases:
R′ = R1. We have C = B, E,P ∪ Q and C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}, with the conditions given in the
definition ofR1. Let us distinguish two cases:
• Case I: C −→ C1 by (RED BAR’). In this case, C = B, E,P ∪ Q, Q = {t[a1, c1, ς1]::Q1,
. . . , t[ak, ck, ςk]::Qk}, P = P1 ∪ {t[ak+1, ck+1, ςk+1]::Qk+1, . . . , t[an, cn, ςn]::Qn}, and C1 =
B′, E,P1 ∪ {Q1ς1, . . . ,Qnςn}, where B′ = B \ {t[a1, c1, z˜1]::Q1, . . . , t[an, cn, z˜n]::Qn} and
z˜i = ordom(ςi) for all i 6 n. For a suitable numbering of processes, we have Pi =
t[ak+i, ck+i, ςk+i]::Qk+i for i = 1, . . . , n− k and P1 = {Pn−k+1, . . . , Pm}. Since C R1 C′, we
have C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R} where P ′ = {P′1, . . . , P′m} with P′i ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Pi))
for all i 6 m and Q′ = {Q′1, . . . ,Q′k} with Q′i ∈ bar-elim′in(t[ai, ci, ςi]::Qi) for all i 6 k.
By Lemma 21, we can reduce the lets so that C′ −→∗ C′2 = ∅, E,P ′2 ∪ Q′ ∪ {R} where
P ′2 = {P′′1 , . . . , P′′m} with P′′i = bar-elim(Pi) for all i 6 m. Furthermore, we can reduce each
P′′i ∈ bar-elim(t[ak+i, ck+i, ςk+i]::Qk+i) for i = 1, . . . , n − k with R by (RED I/O), so that
C′2 −→n−k C′1 = ∅, E,P ′1∪Q′1∪{R1}, where P ′1 = {P′′n−k+1, . . . , P′′m} with P′′i = bar-elim(Pi)
for i = n − k + 1, . . . ,m, Q′1 = {Q′1, . . . ,Q′n} with Q′i ∈ bar-elim′in(t[ai, ci, ςi]::Qi) for all
i 6 n, and R1 = c1〈N f (1)〉. · · · .cn〈N f (n)〉.R′ where Nl = (Ml,1, . . . ,Ml,|ςl|) for all l 6 n and
R′ ∈ swapper1(B′). After these reductions, we obtain C R1 C′1 with k = n. By Fact 2, we
have C1 R2 C′1. Therefore, C1 R C′1 and C′ −→∗ C′1.
• Case II: C −→ C1 without application of (RED BAR). By inspection of our reduction rules,
the reduction C −→ C1 is obtained by reducing processes in P and C1 = B, E1,P1 ∪ Q for
some multiset of processes P1 and set of names E1. By Lemma 21, we can reduce the lets
in P ′ so that C′ →∗ C′2 = B, E1, bar-elim(P) ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}. By Lemma 9(1), C′2 −→ C′1, where
C′1 = ∅, E1, bar-elim(P1) ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}. Hence, C1 R1 C′1 (with k, n, f unchanged), therefore,
C1 R C′1 and C′ −→∗ C′1.
R′ = R2. We have C = B, E,P ∪ Q and C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}, with the conditions given in
the definition of R2. By Fact 1, we have C′ −→∗ C′2 = ∅, E, bar-elim(P ∪ Q) ∪ {R′}, where
R′ ∈ swapper1(B).
• Case I: B = ∅. Since C is a valid configuration, we have barriers(P ∪ Q) ⊆ B, so P and Q
contain no barrier, therefore, P ∪Q = bar-elim(P ∪Q) by definition of bar-elim (Figure 6).
By definition of swapper1, we have R′ = {0}. Hence, C′ −→∗ C′2 = ∅, E,P ∪Q∪{0} −→ C =
∅, E,P ∪ Q. Since C −→ C1, we have C′ −→∗ C1. Moreover, we have C1 R3 C1, so C1 R C1,
and we conclude with C′1 = C1.
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• Case II: B 6= ∅. We have C R1 C′2 with k = 0 by expanding the definition of swapper1(B),
and we conclude by the caseR′ = R1 above.
R′ = R3. We have C = ∅, E,P and C′ = ∅, E,P ′ with barriers(P) = ∅ and P′i ∈ add-lets(Pi) for all
i 6 m. By Lemma 21, we can reduce the lets in P ′ so that C′ −→∗ C = ∅, E,P . Since C −→ C1, we
have C′ −→∗ C1. Moreover, we have C1 R3 C1, so C1 R C1, and we conclude with C′1 = C1.
R′ = R−11 . We have C = ∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R} and C′ = B, E,P ∪ Q, with the conditions given in the
definition ofR1.
• Case I: k = n. SinceQ contains n barriers, we have C′ −→ C′2 = B′, E,P ∪ {Q1ς1, . . . ,Qnςn}
by (RED BAR’). By Fact 2, we have C′2 R2 C, so we conclude by the case R′ = R−12
(below).
• Case II: k < n.
∗ Case II.1: C −→ C1 by reducing at least R. Since R starts with an input on ak+1,
it can only reduce by (RED I/O) with an output on ak+1. The processes in Q′ start
with an input, so they cannot reduce with R. Hence R reduces with a process P′i ∈
add-lets(bar-elim(Pi)) in P ′. If P′i starts with a let, it cannot reduce by (RED I/O),
so we have P′i = bar-elim(Pi). Since ak+1 ∈ channels(B) and C′ is valid, ak+1 /∈
fn-nobc(P∪Q), so ak+1 occurs free inP∪Q only as channel of a barrier inP∪Q. Since
P′i = bar-elim(Pi) starts with an output on ak+1 and barriers(Pi) ⊆ B, we have Pi =
t[ak+1, ck+1, ςk+1]::Qk+1 for some ςk+1 = (Mk+1,1/zk+1,1, . . . , Mk+1,|ςk+1|/zk+1,|ςk+1|). Let
N′k+1 = (Mk+1,1, . . . ,Mk+1,|ςk+1|) and for all l 6= k + 1, N′l = Nl. We have
P′i = ak+1〈N′k+1〉.ck+1(z).let zk+1,1 = pi1,|ςk+1|(z) in · · ·
let zk+1,|ςk+1| = pi|ςk+1|,|ςk+1|(z) in bar-elim(Qk+1) .
Let
Q′k+1 = ck+1(z).let zk+1,1 = pi1,|ςk+1|(z) in · · ·
let zk+1,|ςk+1| = pi|ςk+1|,|ςk+1|(z) in bar-elim(Qk+1)
∈ bar-elim′in(t[ak+1, ck+1, ςk+1]::Qk+1) .
After reduction by (RED I/O), P′i becomes Q′k+1 and R becomes R1 = ak+2(xk+2) .
· · · . an(xn) . c1〈N′f (1)〉 . · · · . cn〈N′f (n)〉 . R′. Let P1 = P \ {Pi}, Q1 = Q′ ∪ {Pi} =
Q′∪{t[ak+1, ck+1, ςk+1]::Qk+1},P ′1 = P ′\{P′i}, andQ′1 = Q′∪{Q′k+1}. Then we have
C = (∅, E,P ′∪Q′∪{R}) −→ C1 = (∅, E,P ′1∪Q′1∪{R1}) and C′ = (B, E,P1∪Q1) R1
C1 = (∅, E,P ′1 ∪ Q′1 ∪ {R1}) (with m decreased by one, k increased by one, and f
unchanged), so we conclude with C′1 = C′.
∗ Case II.2: C −→ C1 by reducing at least a process in Q′. Since we reduce Q′i ∈ Q′,
which starts with an input on ci, this process can only reduce by (RED I/O), with an
output on ci. If it reduced with P′j ∈ P ′, since P′j ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(P j)), we would
actually have P′j = bar-elim(P j). Since C is valid, by Lemma 22, ci /∈ fn(P), so ci /∈
fn(P′j) = fn(bar-elim(P j)) = fn(P j), hence Q′i cannot reduce with a process P′j ∈ P ′. It
also cannot reduce with R or with another process in Q′ since they start with an input.
Therefore, this case cannot happen.
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∗ Case II.3: C −→ C1 by reducing only processes in P ′.
∗ Case II.3.1: a reduced process is P′i 6= bar-elim(Pi). We have P′i ∈ add-lets(
bar-elim(Pi)). By Lemma 21, C1 = ∅, E, (P ′ \ {P′i}) ∪ {P′′i } ∪ Q′ ∪ {R} with
P′′i ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Pi)), so we still have C′ R1 C1, so we conclude with
C′1 = C′.
∗ Case II.3.2: the reduced process(es) are P′i = bar-elim(Pi) and possibly P′j =
bar-elim(P j). Let P ′red = {P′i} or P ′red = {P′i, P′j} be the multiset of reduced pro-
cesses, such that P ′red = bar-elim(Pred), P ′ = P ′stay∪P ′red, P = Pstay∪Pred. We have
C = (∅, E,P ′stay∪bar-elim(Pred)∪Q′∪{R}) −→ C1 = (∅, E1,P ′stay∪P ′red1∪Q′∪{R})
by reducing one or more processes in bar-elim(Pred), so by Lemma 9(2), there ex-
ists Pred1 such that P ′red1 = bar-elim(Pred1) and C′ = (B, E,Pstay ∪ Pred ∪ Q) −→
C′1 = (B, E,Pstay ∪ Pred1 ∪ Q). Letting P1 = Pstay ∪ Pred1 and P ′1 = P ′stay ∪ P ′red1,
we obtain that C′1 = (B, E,P1 ∪ Q) R1 C1 = (∅, E1,P ′1 ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}) (with f , k, n
unchanged), so C1 R C′1.
R′ = R−12 . We have C = ∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R} and C′ = B, E,P ∪ Q, with the conditions given in the
definition ofR2. We distinguish several cases.
• Case I: C −→ C1 by reducing at least R.
∗ Case I.1: k = 0. In this case, Q = Q′ = ∅.
∗ Case I.1.1: B = ∅. Then R = 0, so C −→ C1 = ∅, E,P ′, C′ = ∅, E,P , and fur-
thermore since B = ∅, we have barriers(P) = ∅, so P′i ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Pi)) =
add-lets(Pi), so C′ R3 C1, so C1 R C′. We conclude with C′1 = C′.
∗ Case I.1.2: B 6= ∅. Then we have C′ R1 C by expanding the definition of
swapper1(B), we conclude by using the case R′ = R−11 , Case II.1 (k < n, C −→ C1
by reducing R, above).
∗ Case I.2: k > 0. The process R starts with an output on c1, hence it can only re-
duce by (RED I/O) with an input on c1. If R reduced with P′i ∈ P ′, since P′i ∈
add-lets(bar-elim(Pi)), we would actually have P′i = bar-elim(Pi). By definition ofR2,
c1 /∈ fn(Pi), so c1 /∈ fn(P′i) = fn(bar-elim(Pi)) = fn(Pi), hence R cannot reduce with
P′i ∈ P ′. It cannot reduce with Q′i for i > 1 because c1, . . . , ck are pairwise distinct.
Therefore, R reduces with Q′1 by (RED I/O). After reduction, R is transformed into
R1 = c2〈M2〉 . · · · . ck〈Mk〉 . R′
with R′ ∈ swapper1(B), and since Q′1 ∈ bar-elimin(c1〈M1〉,Q1),
Q′1 = c1(z).let z1 = pi1,n(z) in · · · let zn = pin,n(z) in bar-elim(Q′)
with M1 = (N1, . . . ,Nn), Q1 = Q′{N1/z1, . . . , Nn/zn}, and z, z1, . . . , zn pairwise distinct
variables is transformed into
P′m+1 = let z1 = pi1,n(M1) in · · · let zn = pin,n(M1) in bar-elim(Q′)
∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Q1))
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because bar-elim(Q1) = bar-elim(Q′){N1/z1, . . . , Nn/zn} by Lemma 8. We let P1 =
P ∪ {Q1}, Q1 = Q \ {Q1}, P ′1 = P ′ ∪ {P′m+1}, and Q′1 = Q′ \ {Q′1}. Then we have
C = (∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}) −→ C1 = (∅, E,P ′1 ∪ Q′1 ∪ {R1}) and C′ = (B, E,P ∪ Q) =
(B, E,P1 ∪ Q1) R2 C1 = (∅, E,P ′1 ∪ Q′1 ∪ {R1}) (with k decreased by one and m
increased by one), so we conclude with C′1 = C′.
• Case II: C −→ C1 by reducing at least a process in Q′ and not reducing R. Since we reduce
Q′i ∈ Q′, which starts with an input on ci, this process can reduce only by (RED I/O),
with an output on ci. If it reduced with P′j ∈ P ′, since P′j ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(P j)), we
would actually have P′j = bar-elim(P j). By definition of R2, ci /∈ fn(P j), so ci /∈ fn(P′j) =
fn(bar-elim(P j)) = fn(P j), hence Q′i cannot reduce with a process P′j ∈ P ′. Moreover,
Q′i cannot reduce with another process in Q′ because all these processes start with inputs.
Therefore, this case is impossible.
• Case III: C −→ C1 by reducing only processes in P ′. This case is similar to the case R′ =
R−11 , Case II.3.
R′ = R−13 . We have C = ∅, E,P ′ and C′ = ∅, E,P with barriers(P) = ∅, P = {P1, . . . , Pm}, P ′ =
{P′1, . . . , P′m}, and for all i 6 m, P′i ∈ add-lets(Pi).
• Case I: a reduced process is P′i 6= Pi. We have P′i ∈ add-lets(Pi). By Lemma 21, C1 =
∅, E, (P ′ \ {P′i}) ∪ {P′′i } with P′′i ∈ add-lets(Pi), so we still have C′ R3 C1, so we conclude
with C′1 = C′.
• Case II: the reduced process(es) are P′i = Pi and possibly P′j = P j. Let Pred = {Pi} or
Pred = {Pi, P j} be the multiset of reduced processes, P ′ = P ′stay∪Pred, and P = Pstay∪Pred.
We have C = (∅, E,P ′stay ∪ Pred) −→ C1 = (∅, E1,P ′stay ∪ Pred1) by reducing one or more
processes in Pred. Since the reduction rules are independent of the non-reduced processes,
we also have C′ = (∅, E,Pstay∪Pred) −→ C′1 = (∅, E1,Pstay∪Pred1) and furthermore C′1 R3 C1,
so C1 R C′1.
Condition 3. We show that, if C Ri C′ and C[_] is an adversarial context, then C[C] Ri C[C′], for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let C[_] = ν n˜.(_ | Q) with fv(Q) = ∅ and barriers(Q) = ∅. We rename E in C and C′ so
that E ∩ fn(Q) = ∅.
i = 1. We have C = B, E,P ∪ Q and C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}. Let P1 = P ∪ {Q}, P ′1 =
P ′ ∪ {Q}, and E1 = E ∪ {n˜}. Since Q contains no barrier, we have bar-elim(Q) = Q, so
Q ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Q)), hence C[C] = (B, E1,P1 ∪ Q) R1 C[C′] = (∅, E1,P ′1 ∪ Q′ ∪ {R})
(with m increased by one and k, n, f unchanged).
i = 2. We have C = B, E,P ∪ Q and C′ = ∅, E,P ′ ∪ Q′ ∪ {R}. Let P1 = P ∪ {Q}, P ′1 =
P ′ ∪ {Q}, and E1 = E ∪ {n˜}. Since Q contains no barrier, we have bar-elim(Q) = Q, so
Q ∈ add-lets(bar-elim(Q)), hence C[C] = (B, E1,P1 ∪ Q) R2 C[C′] = (∅, E1,P ′1 ∪ Q′ ∪ {R})
(with m increased by one and k unchanged.)
i = 3. We have C = B, E,P and C′ = ∅, E,P ′. Let P1 = P ∪ {Q}, P ′1 = P ′ ∪ {Q}, and E1 = E ∪ {n˜}.
We have Q ∈ add-lets(Q), so C[C] = (B, E1,P1) R3 C[C′] = (∅, E1,P ′1) (with m increased by
one).
Conclusion. Since R is symmetric and satisfies the three conditions of Definition 1, we have R ⊆ ≈.
Since fst(C0) R fst(C′0) and snd(C0) R snd(C′0), we conclude that fst(C0) ≈ fst(C′0) and snd(C0) ≈
snd(C′0). 
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Appendix G. Proofs of Propositions 10 and 11
Proof of Proposition 10. We have B, E, {ν n.P} ∪ P → B, E ∪ {n′}, {P{n′/n}} ∪ P by (RED RES),
so by Lemma 2, B, E ∪ {n′}, {P{n′/n}} ∪ P is also a valid configuration.
We define the relationsR0 andR1 by
C R0 C
(B, E, {ν n.P} ∪ P) R1 (B, E ∪ {n′}, {P{n′/n}} ∪ P)
for any C, B, E, n, n′, P, P such that n′ 6∈ E ∪ fn({ν n.P} ∪ P) and C, (B, E, {ν n.P} ∪ P), and (B, E ∪
{n′}, {P{n′/n}} ∪ P) are valid configurations. We have thatR0 ∪ R1 ∪ R−11 is symmetric and satisfies
the three conditions of Definition 1. Hence R0 ∪ R1 ∪ R−11 ⊆ ≈. This property implies the desired
equivalence. 
Proof of Proposition 11. We have B, E, {P | Q} ∪ P → B, E, {P,Q} ∪ P by (RED PAR), so by
Lemma 2, B, E, {P,Q} ∪ P is also a valid configuration.
We define the relationsR0 andR1 by
C R0 C
(B, E, {P | Q} ∪ P) R1 (B, E, {P,Q} ∪ P)
for any C, B, E, P, Q, P such that C, (B, E, {P | Q}∪P), and (B, E, {P,Q}∪P) are valid configurations.
We have that R0 ∪ R1 ∪ R−11 is symmetric and satisfies the three conditions of Definition 1. Hence
R0 ∪ R1 ∪ R−11 ⊆ ≈. This property implies the desired equivalence. 
Appendix H. Proofs for Section 3.5.1 (replicated barriers)
Proof sketch of Proposition 14. Since barriers are forbidden under replication, the process Q does not
contain any barrier. We have annotate(C[!Q]) = C1[!Q] and annotate(C[!nQ]) = C1[!nQ], for someC1[_]
obtained by annotating the barriers in C[_]. By induction on C1[_], we have bar-elim(C1[!Q]) = C2[!Q]
and bar-elim(C1[!nQ]) = C2[!nQ] for some C2[_]. Let B = barriers(C1[!Q]) = barriers(C1[!nQ]) and
{a˜} = channels(B). So compiler(C[!Q]) = elim-and-swap(C1[!Q]) = {C3[!Q] | C3[_] = ν a˜.(C2[_] |
R),R ∈ swapper(B)} and compiler(C[!nQ]) = elim-and-swap(C1[!nQ]) = {C3[!nQ] | C3[_] =
ν a˜.(C2[_] | R),R ∈ swapper(B)}.
Let C4[_] = ν n˜.(_ | Q′) be an adversarial context. We have C4[Cinit(C3[!nQ])] = ∅, {n˜}, {C3[!nQ],Q′}
and similarly C4[Cinit(C3[!Q])] = ∅, {n˜}, {C3[!Q],Q′}. Moreover, for any context C3[_], all traces
of ∅, {n˜}, {C3[!nQ],Q′} are matched by traces of ∅, {n˜}, {C3[!Q],Q′}, by expanding the replication
!Q n times when it appears at the root of a process in a semantic configuration. Therefore, if
∅, {n˜}, {C3[!nQ],Q′} →∗↑, then ∅, {n˜}, {C3[!Q],Q′} →∗↑. Hence, if C3[!Q] satisfies diff-equivalence,
then C3[!nQ] satisfies diff-equivalence. So we conclude that, if some process in compiler(C[!Q]) satisfies
diff-equivalence, then some process in compiler(C[!nQ]) satisfies diff-equivalence. 
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Proof sketch of Proposition 15. Let P = C[Q] and P′ = C[t::Q]. Since annotation proceeds from
top to bottom, we annotate the barriers in C[_] first, transforming P = C[Q] into C1[Q1] and P′ =
C[t::Q] intoC1[t::Q1]. Then we annotate t::Q1, transforming P′ intoC1[t[a, c, ς]::Q′1] where Q1 = Q′1ς.
Then we annotate the barriers in Q1, respectively Q′1. If split(U,Q) = (Q′, ς′) and (fv(range(ς)) ∪
fn(range(ς))∪dom(ς))∩U = ∅, then split(U,Qς) = (Q′, ς′ς), by induction on Q. Let Q′1 = C′[t′::Q2].
Then Q1 = C′ς[t′::Q2ς], after renaming the bound names and variables of C′[_] so that they do not
occur in ς, and we have split(∅,Q2) = (Q3, ς′), so split(∅,Q2ς) = (Q3, ς′ς). Therefore, by annotating
t′::Q2, Q′1 becomes Q′4 = C′[t′[a′, c′, ς′]::Q3] and Q1 becomes C′ς[t′[a′, c′, ς′ς]::Q3] = Q′4ς since
fv(Q3) ⊆ dom(ς′). Hence, the property that P′ is transformed intoC1[t[a, c, ς]::Q′1] and P is transformed
into C1[Q′1ς] for some C1[_], ς, Q′1, and fresh names a, c is preserved by annotation of Q′1, respectively
Q′1ς. Therefore,
P′1 = annotate(P
′) = C1[t[a, c, ς]::Q′1]
P1 = annotate(P) = C1[Q′1ς]
for some C1[_], ς, Q′1, and fresh names a, c that do not occur in C1[_], ς, and Q′1.
Let us define
add-in-let(Q, a, c, ς) = c(z).let z1 = pi1,n(z) in · · · let zn = pin,n(z) in Q
add-out-in-let(Q, a, c, ς) = a〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉.add-in-let(Q, a, c, ς)
where ς = (M1/z1, . . . , Mn/zn) and z is a fresh variable.
We have
bar-elim(C1[t[a, c, ς]::Q′1]) = C2[add-out-in-let(bar-elim(Q
′
1), a, c, ς)]
bar-elim(C1[Q′1ς]) = C2[bar-elim(Q
′
1ς)]
for some C2[_] such that a and c do not occur in C2[_], by induction on C1[_]. Furthermore, C1[_] and
C2[_] do not contain replications above the hole, since barriers never occur under replication. So
bar-elim(P′1) = C2[add-out-in-let(bar-elim(Q
′
1), a, c, ς)]
bar-elim(P1) = C2[bar-elim(Q′1ς)] = C2[bar-elim(Q
′
1)ς]
by Lemma 8. Moreover,
barriers(P′1) = {t[a, c, ordom(ς)]::Q′1} ∪ barriers(P1) .
So, considering permutations f that leave j unchanged when the j-th barrier is t[a, c, ordom(ς)]::Q′1, we
have that
swapper(barriers(P′1)) ⊇ {C3,i[a(x).C4,i[c〈x〉.Q2,i]] | i = 1, . . . , n}
swapper(barriers(P1)) = {C3,i[C4,i[Q2,i]] | i = 1, . . . , n}
54 B. Blanchet & B. Smyth / Automated reasoning for equivalences in the applied pi calculus with barriers
for some families of contexts C3,i[_] and C4,i[_] and processes Q2,i, such that C3,i[_] and C4,i[_] do
not bind x and do not contain replications, x is not free in C4,i and Q2,i, and a and c do not occur in
C3,i[_], C4,i[_], and Q2,i. We make a small abuse here: we write c〈x〉.Q2,i instead of c〈diff[x, x]〉.Q2,i.
It is clear that the replacement of diff[x, x] with x does not change the behaviour of the process. Let
{a˜} = channels(barriers(P1)). We have channels(barriers(P′1)) = {a˜, a, c}. We finally obtain that
compiler(P′) = elim-and-swap(P′1) ⊇ {P′2,i | i = 1, . . . , n}
compiler(P) = elim-and-swap(P1) = {P2,i | i = 1, . . . , n}
where
P′2,i = ν a˜, a, c.(C2[add-out-in-let(Q
′
2, a, c, ς)] | C3,i[a(x).C4,i[c〈x〉.Q2,i]])
P2,i = ν a˜.(C2[Q′2ς] | C3,i[C4,i[Q2,i]])
for some C2[_], Q′2, C3,i[_], C4,i[_], Q2,i, ς, a˜, a, c, x, such that C2[_] does not contain replications above
the hole, C3,i[_] and C4,i[_] do not bind x and do not contain replications, x is not free in C4,i and Q2,i,
and a and c do not occur in C2[_], Q′2, C3,i[_], C4,i[_], Q2,i, ς, and a˜.
Let C5[_] = ν n.(_ | Q′) be an adversarial context. We have C5[Cinit(P′2,i)] = ∅, {n˜}, {P′2,i,Q′} and
similarly C5[Cinit(P2,i)] = ∅, {n˜}, {P2,i,Q′}. We show that all traces of ∅, {n˜}, {P′2,i,Q′} are matched by
traces of ∅, {n˜}, {P2,i,Q′}. Formally, if ∅, {n˜}, {P′2,i,Q′} →∗ C, then one of the following cases occurs:
(1) C = ∅, E′, {ν b˜′.(C2[add-out-in-let(Q′2, a, c, ς)] | C3,i[a(x).C4,i[c〈x〉.Q2,i]])} ∪ P
∅, {n˜}, {P2,i,Q′} →∗ ∅, E, {ν b˜.(C2[Q′2ς] | C3,i[C4,i[Q2,i]])} ∪ P
for some E, E′, b˜, b˜′, and P such that {a, c} ∩ (E ∪ {b˜}) = ∅, E′ ∪ {b˜′} = E ∪ {b˜, a, c}, and a
and c do not occur in P .
(2) C = ∅, E ∪ {a, c}, {C2[add-out-in-let(Q′2, a, c, ς)],C3[a(x).C4[c〈x〉.Q2]])} ∪ P
∅, {n˜}, {P2,i,Q′} →∗ ∅, E, {C2[Q′2ς],C3[C4[Q2]]} ∪ P
for some E, C2[_], Q′2, C3[_], C4[_], Q2, ς, P such that C2[_] does not contain replications above
the hole, C3[_] and C4[_] do not bind x and do not contain replications, x is not free in C4[_] and
Q2, and a and c do not occur in C2[_], Q′2, C3[_], C4[_], Q2, P , ς, and E. (C2[_], ς, and Q2 may
be different from the initial ones.)
(3) C = ∅, E ∪ {a, c}, {add-in-let(Q′2, a, c, ς),C4[c〈(M1, . . . ,Mn)〉.Q2]} ∪ P
∅, {n˜}, {P2,i,Q′} →∗ ∅, E, {Q′2ς,C4[Q2]} ∪ P
for some E, Q′2, C4[_], Q2, ς, M1, . . . , Mn, P such that ς = (M1/z1, . . . , Mn/zn), C4[_] does not
contain replications, and a and c do not occur in Q′2, C4[_], Q2, P , ς, and E. (ς and Q2 may be
different from the initial ones.)
(4) C = ∅, E ∪ {a, c}, {Q4} ∪ P and ∅, {n˜}, {P2,i,Q′} →∗ ∅, E, {Q3} ∪ P for some E, Q3, Q4, and P
such that Q4 ∈ add-lets(Q3).
This property is proved by induction on the length of the trace ∅, {n˜}, {P′2,i,Q′} →∗ C. By inspecting
all cases, we conclude that, if ∅, {n˜}, {P′2,i,Q′} →∗↑, then ∅, {n˜}, {P2,i,Q′} →∗↑. Hence, if P2,i satisfies
diff-equivalence, then P′2,i also satisfies diff-equivalence. So, if some process in compiler(P) satisfies
diff-equivalence, then some process in compiler(P′) satisfies diff-equivalence. 
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